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Bertillonage in an Age of Surveillance:




In January 2020, when SARS-CoV-2 was just emerging as a global pan-
demic, Robert Julian-Borchak Williams received a call at his workplace from
Detroit Police telling him to surrender himself for arrest.1 A father of two
young daughters, husband, and upstanding member of the venerable Detroit
automotive community, Mr. Williams assumed it must be a prank of some
kind, so he went about his day.2 When he later returned to his suburban
home, he found out it was no joke when armed officers surrounded him,
handcuffed him, and arrested him in full view of his family and neighbors.3
To add yet more insult, the arresting officers refused to tell Mr. Williams’s
wife where he was being taken, instead instructing her disdainfully to
“Google it.”4
After processing Mr. Williams, investigators took him to a room for
interrogation.5 There, they revealed that they had secured a warrant charging
him with shoplifting $3,800 of watches from a store in 2018.6 Their evi-
dence? Two grainy still images taken from a security video of a man who
was clearly not, the officers agreed, Mr. Williams.7 Their response? “I guess
the computer got it wrong.”8 Unfortunately, because he was arrested on a
warrant, Mr. Williams was held for more than a day until he could post
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7. Hill, supra note 1.
8. Id.
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bond.9 Weeks later, at arraignment, prosecutors dismissed the charges alto-
gether.10 But what on earth did the officers mean when they blamed the
whole affair on a computer error?
As it turned out, Mr. Williams was arrested largely on the basis of anal-
ysis performed by a facial recognition system operated by the Michigan State
Police.11 Analysts compared those two security camera images to a database
of 49 million images, including driver’s license photos.12 Mr. Williams was
targeted because the system identified him as a probable match using the
picture from his license.13 He was arrested when an employee of the store’s
security company identified Mr. Williams from a photo array despite her
having no first-hand knowledge of the crime—she had just watched the se-
curity video.14 Unfortunately, it does not appear that the human investigators
made an independent assessment of the purported photo match, which inves-
tigators later agreed was obviously in error.15 Neither did officers conduct
any additional investigation or question Mr. Williams before applying for a
warrant.16
Although Mr. Williams’s case may be the first documented incident of
false arrest based on facial recognition, Georgetown Law Professor and facial
recognition expert Clare Garvie17 commented that it is likely “not the first
case to misidentify someone [or] to arrest them for a crime they didn’t com-









17. Professor Garvie is lead author with Alvaro Bedoya and Jonathan Frankle of
the definitive study of law enforcement use of facial recognition technology.
Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up: Un-
regulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY &
TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016), www.perpetuallineup.org.
18. Hill, supra note 1. In May 2019, Professor Garvie documented one case that
came close involving New York City Police investigators’ using an image of
actor Woody Harrelson to identify a shoplifting suspect. They first used a se-
curity camera photo, but when their facial recognition search failed to produce
any matches, they noted a resemblance between the suspect and Mr. Harrelson,
so used a picture of the actor retrieved from the web to run a second search.
They were successful in identifying and arresting the wrong person. Though
that incident is particularly problematic, Professor Garvie notes that law en-
forcement agencies frequently use composite sketches created in collaboration
with witnesses as comparator images for facial recognition, which is a practice
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recognition technology is increasingly in widespread use by law enforcement
agencies19—at least half of us are in law enforcement face recognition net-
works20—despite documented evidence of false positives, particularly among
members of minority groups.21
One of the most prominent providers of facial recognition technologies
to law enforcement is Clearview AI.22 Clearview scrapes the internet, social
media, and even financial services sites—millions in total—to gather and
aggregate images of faces.23 It then offers users the opportunity to use the
Clearview app to match comparator images provided by a user with images
from that massive database.24 Clearview has hundreds of law enforcement
agencies among its clients and has exploded in popularity.25 This is despite
the fact that, unlike most technology companies in the facial recognition bus-
iness, Clearview has not submitted its technology to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST),26 which has been conducting independent
assessments of facial recognition technologies since 2000.27 More disturbing
that is very likely to generate unreliable results. See Clare Garvie, Garbage In,
Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY &
TECH. (May 19, 2019), www.flawedfacedata.com.
19. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How Police Use Facial Recognition, and Where it
Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/
technology/facial-recognition-police.html.
20. Garvie et al., supra note 17.
21. See Travis LeBlanc, INSIGHT: Facial Recognition is a Threat to People of
Color, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-
and-telecom-law/insight-facial-recognition-is-a-threat-to-people-of-color; PAT-
RICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN, & KAYEE HANAOKA, NISTIR 8280, FACE RECOG-
NITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT), PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS, NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS & TECH. (2019), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280 (docu-
menting racial disparities in error rates produced by facial recognition technol-
ogies); Natasha Singer & Cade Metz, Many Facial-Recognition Systems are
Biased, Says U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/facial-recognition-bias.html; Steve
Lohr, Facial Recognition is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-
race-artificial-intelligence.html.
22. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It,






27. Facial Recognition Technology (FRT): Testimony Before the House Committee
on Homeland Security, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Charles Romine, Di-
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still, Clearview and its ilk are not subject to regulation, raising the specter of
misuse, abuse, or just pervasive use that would dramatically alter our concep-
tions of privacy.28 In the absence of restraint, law enforcement agencies are
using facial recognition technologies with increasing frequency and often to
solve relatively minor crimes like shoplifting.29 Citing some of these con-
cerns, many major technology companies have been very cautious in rolling
out their facial recognition technologies.30 Some have refused to make their
tools available to law enforcement.31 Others have abandoned the enterprise
altogether.32
Law enforcement is not the only government agency seeking to leverage
facial recognition technologies. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) uses facial recognition for investigative purposes.33 ICE has also mined
millions of driver’s license photos in an effort to find undocumented aliens.34
rector, Information Technology Laboratory, Department of Commerce’s Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology), https://tinyurl.com/y2hte6aa.
28. Hill, supra note 22; Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“If deployed pervasively on
surveillance video or police-worn body cameras, real-time face recognition will
redefine the nature of public spaces.”); Clearview is the target of a class action
lawsuit in Illinois. See ACLU Sues Clearview AI, AM. C.L. UNION (May 28,
2020), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-sues-clearview-ai; Davey
Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy ‘Nightmare Scenario’, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/technology/
clearview-ai-privacy-lawsuit.html.
29. Alfred Ng, Police are Using Facial Recognition for Minor Crimes Because




30. Karen Weise & Natasha Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of Its Facial Rec-
ognition Software, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/10/technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html.
31. See, e.g., Clare Duffy, Microsoft President Calls for Federal Regulation of
Facial Recognition Technology, CNN (June 18, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/06/18/tech/brad-smith-microsoft-facial-recognition/index.html; Weise &
Singer, supra note 30.
32. Ina Fried, IBM Is Exiting the Face Recognition Business, AXIOS (June 8, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/ibm-is-exiting-the-face-recognition-business-62e79f09-
34a2-4f1d-a541-caba112415c6.html.
33. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ICE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SER-
VICES, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (May 13, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-frs-054-may2020.pdf.
34. Drew Harwell & Erin Cox, ICE Has Run Facial-Recognition Searches on Mil-
lions of Maryland Drivers, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2020), www.washington
post.com/technology/2020/02/26/ice-has-run-facial-recognition-searches-mil-
lions-maryland-drivers; Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to
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Customs and Border Protection uses facial recognition to confirm the identi-
ties of travelers exiting and reentering the country.35 Airports are now mak-
ing more expansive use of facial recognition to monitor domestic travel.36
Although some uses are under review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board,37 these deployments are not subject to legislative or judicial
regulation.
Facial recognition technologies are even being deployed to combat the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.38 Clearview AI has proposed accessing feeds from
security cameras to conduct contact tracing by tracking people who test posi-
tive, identifying persons who may have been exposed, and then tracing their
movements to determine other potential exposures.39 Hawaii is in the midst
of deploying a surveillance system that uses thermal scanners and facial rec-
ognition to identify and track persons exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19.40
The technology could also be used to enforce quarantine orders, alerting au-
thorities when someone who should be at home is out in public. Some public
school districts are considering similar systems, which would come with the
bonus benefit of controlling access to school buildings and monitoring the
comings and goings of students, faculty, and staff.41 All of these various uses
Mine State Driver’s License Databases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-
recognition.html.
35. Say Hello to the New Face of Speed, Security, and Safety: Introducing Biomet-
ric Facial Comparison, U.S. CUST. & BORDER PROT., https://biomet-
rics.cbp.gov/.
36. David Oliver, Facial Recognition Scanners are Already at Some US Airports.
Here’s What to Know, USA TODAY (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/travel/airline-news/2019/08/16/biometric-airport-screening-fa-
cial-recognition-everything-you-need-know/1998749001/.
37. Projects, U.S. PRIV. CIV. LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/
Projects (last visited June 14, 2021).
38. Controversial Tech Company Pitches Facial Recognition to Track COVID-19,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/now/video/controver-
sial-tech-company-pitches-facial-recognition-to-track-covid-19-82638917537.
39. Jacob Ward & Chiara Sottile, A Facial Recognition Company Wants to Help
with Contact Tracing. A Senator has Questions., NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020,
8:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/facial-recognition-com-
pany-wants-help-contact-tracing-senator-has-questions-n1197291.
40. Ryan Finnerty, Thermal Screening Cameras in Place at Airports Statewide,
HAW. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.hawaiipublicradio.org/post/
thermal-screening-cameras-place-airports-statewide.
41. Gregory Barber, Schools Adopt Face Recognition in the Name of Fighting
Covid, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/schools-adopt-
face-recognition-name-fighting-covid/.
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suggest an emerging reality of ubiquitous facial recognition,42 what Professor
Christopher Slobogin has dubbed “panvasive” surveillance.43
All of this is of course worrying from a privacy point of view. But there
are also significant risks of abuse. As one example, China reportedly uses
facial recognition technology to target its already beleaguered Uighurs.44
Don’t think facial recognition technology would be used to target political or
religious groups here in the land of the free? There is already a long history
of police and other government agencies using surveillance technologies to
monitor political groups and identify participants in public protests.45 In
keeping with that tradition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
used unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) during the summer of 2020 to moni-
tor protests and demonstrators in the wake of George Floyd’s murder.46 Al-
though DHS denies that these drones were equipped with facial recognition
technologies, there is nothing save technical limitations secondary to image
quality and angle of surveillance to stop them from using facial recognition
to identify participants.47 Of course, ground-level images taken from body
cameras, security cameras, and surveillance cameras suffer no such limits.48
Once contemplated only in science fiction, rapid advances in the tech-
nologies, plummeting costs, and endless demand have made it almost certain
that we are now, or soon will be, subject to monitoring, surveillance, and
42. Id.
43. See Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory,
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014).
44. Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to
Profile a Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-
profiling.html.
45. See Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“[H]ere is a real risk that police face recogni-
tion will be used to stifle free speech. There is also a history of FBI and police
surveillance of civil rights protests.”). One such case is Handschu v. Special
Services Division, which involved the surveillance of political groups in New
York. See Handschu v. Special Services Division (Challenging NYPD Surveil-
lance Practices Targeting Political Groups), N.Y. AM. C.L. UNION, https://
www.nyclu.org/en/cases/handschu-v-special-services-division-challenging-
nypd-surveillance-practices-targeting. See also David Gray & Danielle Citron,
The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 116–17 (2013) (dis-
cussing Handschu as a model for consent decrees regulating surveillance
technologies).
46. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, U.S. Watched George Floyd Protests in 15 Cities Using
Aerial Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protests-surveillance.html.
47. Id. (reporting DHS’s claims that images taken from the drones were taken from
altitude and at a high angle, making the use of facial recognition technologies
impossible).
48. Id.
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tracking by facial recognition technologies on a routine basis. Although a
few states and localities have taken steps to regulate the use of facial recogni-
tion technologies by law enforcement and other government agencies, most
have not.49 Congress has likewise failed to take any action to restrain these
executive agencies.50 Faced by that failure, we might hope that the courts, as
a coequal branch, could impose some restraints on the deployment and use of
facial recognition technologies. One place courts might look for a source of
authority is the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees that the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.”51 This article takes up
that possibility.
This article argues that the Fourth Amendment limits the authority of
government agents and their partners to deploy and use facial recognition
technologies. Part I provides a very basic overview of facial recognition tech-
nology and situates it in a long tradition of biometric identification methods
going back, at least, to the work of Alphonse Bertillon in the eighteenth cen-
tury. As we shall see, facial recognition is a multi-step process.52 Each step
presents significant technical and practical challenges, which raise serious
concerns about the ultimate reliability of the technology in many environ-
ments where government agents might hope to use it. Part II addresses the
threshold question for any Fourth Amendment analysis: whether government
actions constitute a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Part II
argues that the deployment and use of facial recognition technologies consti-
tutes a “search” under both the text of the Fourth Amendment and prevailing
Supreme Court doctrine. This does not mean that government agents cannot
use facial recognition technologies. The Fourth Amendment instead com-
mands that facial recognition “shall not” be used in ways that threaten the
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches.53 Part III de-
scribes how constitutional actors, inclusive of executive branch representa-
tives, legislatures, and courts, might strike the right balance, allowing for the
49. See Singer & Metz, supra note 21 (reporting that “San Francisco, Oakland and
Berkeley in California and the Massachusetts communities Somerville and
Brookline [have] banned government use of [facial recognition] technology.”).
Some states have passed regulations on biometric data. See, e.g., 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 14 (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020
(West 2021); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a) (West 2021) (Bio-
metric Identifiers). The American Civil Liberties Union recently sued
Clearview AI under the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act. ACLU Sues Clearview
AI, supra note 28.
50. ACLU Sues Clearview AI, supra note 28.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. Yaroslav Kuflinski, How Facial Recognition Works, IFLEXION (July 17, 2018),
https://www.iflexion.com/blog/face-recognition-algorithms-work.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonable use of facial recognition while guarding against its use to facili-
tate broad, indiscriminate, and intrusive searches.
I. FACIAL RECOGNITION: THE NEW BERTILLONAGE
Modern facial recognition technologies owe much to Alphonse Bertil-
lon, a nineteenth century civilian employee of the Parisian police.54 In the
1880s, Bertillon developed a biometric method for identifying suspects and
arrestees.55 Eschewing vague and subjective physical descriptions, the Bertil-
lon card system required officers to measure and record biomarkers such as
the “circumferences of prisoners’ heads, arms spans, left foot length, and
length of left middle finger.”56 Bertillon “would later add sitting height,
width of head between the cheek bones, the length of ears, left forearm, and
left little finger, as well as standing height.”57 By taking and recording these
measurements on cards that could be filed and later accessed, Bertillon hoped
to help law enforcement and prosecutors to identify repeat offenders who
might otherwise escape justice by changing their names or adopting aliases.58
Referred to as “Bertillonage,” the system operated on the presumption that
concatenating a series of these biometric measurements could pick-out
unique individuals.59 Two people might have the same wrist and neck cir-
cumferences, but the odds that they would have the same measurements and
ratios on all the Bertillon markers would be astronomical.60
Bertillonage arrived during an era when the social sciences were very
interested in biometrics. Though already the target of significant skepticism
in the academy, phrenology had a firm foothold in nineteenth century psy-
chology and criminology.61 Samuel Morton and Charles Caldwell were hard
at work collecting and measuring skulls in an effort to provide scientific
proof for the existence of race and empirical justifications for racist practices
and social institutions.62 Close on their heels, Paul Broca was establishing the
54. WILBUR R. MILLER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 115–17, 453 (2012); Jim Fisher, Alphonse Bertil-
lon: The Father of Criminal Identification, JIM FISHER: OFF. WEBSITE, https://
jimfisher.edinboro.edu/forensics/bertillon1.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2008).





60. Id. (explaining Bertillon also worked to standardize mugshots, encouraging all
precincts to take the same two photos—front-facing, and profile—under simi-
lar lighting conditions, further enhancing law enforcement’s ability to identify
repeat offenders).
61. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 82–100 (1996).
62. Id.
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field of craniometry, which purported to draw conclusions about intelligence
and moral character by measuring the size, shape, angles, and ratios of heads
and faces.63 Although Bertillonage nominally aspired only to identify per-
sons, the system rode this nineteenth century wave of ambitious empiricism
to acclaim and acceptance.64 Unfortunately, even these more modest ambi-
tions for the careful measurement of bodies proved to be more than the
method could bear.
Bertillonage proved to be less than effective, producing both false posi-
tives and false negatives.65 Part of the problem was user error. Different de-
partments used different biometric measurements.66 For example, England’s
Bertillon system used head height, head width, length of middle finger,
length of the left foot, and length of the forearm from elbow to middle finger,
without apparent regard for whether these measurements were sufficiently
unique to render reliable identifications, either individually or in the aggre-
gate.67 For example, that elbow-to-tip of the middle finger dimension is
known as a “cubit,” which has been used as a standard measure of length for
thousands of years68—not the sort of biometric marker you would think capa-
ble of reliably identifying individual persons. Bertillon also seemed to have
committed a bit of a sampling error, drawing conclusions about the power of
his system based on measurements taken from relatively small groups.69
Then there is the fact that most people are medium and have the same basic
proportions in their bodies and facial structures70—facts familiar to any stu-
dent of portraiture.
The Bertillon card system faded away in the early twentieth century,
and ultimately was displaced by fingerprint analysis.71 But that demise just
63. Id. at 114–39.
64. Fisher, supra note 54, at 1. There is some evidence that Bertillon himself was
sympathetic to race science and eugenics. See Jacob Sherkow, Maryland (v.
King) Corrections Department: David Kaye on Bertillonage, STAN. L. SCH. L.
& BIOSCIENCES BLOG (June 11, 2013), https://law.stanford.edu/2013/06/11/law
andbiosciences-2013-06-11-maryland-v-king-corrections-department-david-
kaye-on-bertillonage/.
65. See Fisher, supra note 54, at 2.
66. See id.
67. Visible Proofs: Forensic Views of the Body: Galleries: Technologies: The Ber-
tillon System, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/vis-
ibleproofs/galleries/technologies/bertillon.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2014).
68. Id.
69. See Sherkow, supra note 64.
70. Id. (pointing out that Bertillonage suffers from endogeneity).
71. See LISA S. NELSON, AMERICA IDENTIFIED: BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY AND SO-
CIETY 31–34 (2011); Fisher, supra note 54, at 2. Of course, fingerprinting has
its own challenges, some of which share a kinship with the Bertillon card sys-
tem. For example, different law enforcement agencies apply different standards
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confirmed the lasting influence of Bertillon’s ideas about biometric identifi-
cation. For example, the predominate approach to fingerprint analysis—the
reigning gold standard of biometric identification—proceeds by analyzing
specific biomarkers in a base sample, using that analysis to compare the base
sample to another sample, evaluating that comparison to determine whether
there is a match, and then verifying those results.72 That basic process forms
the analytic backbone of most forensic identification methods,73 including
facial recognition.
Modern facial recognition technology leverages digital imaging, data
storage, and computer analysis to fulfill Bertillon’s vision of a reliable bio-
metric method for confirming identity.74 These technologies generally serve
one of two purposes: verification or identification.75 As examples, facial rec-
ognition might be used to control access to secure facilities by verifying the
identities of authorized personnel or to determine the identity of a person
photographed at the scene of a crime. Regardless of the application, facial
recognition entails five primary steps: (1) capturing an image; (2) facial lo-
calization or detection; (3) extracting features; (4) comparing features; and
(5) making a determination or prediction.76 Each of these steps comes with
its own challenges. Different technologies adopt different strategies to ad-
when assessing whether two fingerprints have a sufficient number of similar
“Galton points” to warrant determination of a “match” and the absence of clear
evidence that matching any particular number of Galton points would guaran-
tee accuracy. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 555 (E.D.
Pa. 2002); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 140–44 (2009). There is also a considera-
bly amount of artistry to the “science” of fingerprinting, leading one critic to
describe the process as little more than an exercise of “careful looking.” United
States v. Council, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting Dr.
Jennifer Mnookin). See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fin-
gerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROB.
& RISK 127, 132–34 (2008) (criticizing the certitude of fingerprinting as a sci-
ence and fingerprint analysts as witnesses).
72. John R. Vanderkolk, Examination Process, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK
255 (2011), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225320.pdf (describing the
ACE-V method).
73. Id.
74. P’SHIP ON AI, UNDERSTANDING FACIAL RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 2–8 (Feb. 19,
2020), https://www.partnershiponai.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Under
standing-Facial-Recognition-Paper_final.pdf (citing KRISTIE BALL ET AL.,
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES (2012)).
75. William Crumpler, How Accurate are Facial Recognition Systems—and Why
Does It Matter?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC INT’L STUD. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://
www.csis.org/blogs/technology-policy-blog/how-accurate-are-facial-recogni-
tion-systems-%E2%80%93-and-why-does-it-matter.
76. Garvie et al., supra note 17.
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dress those challenges. Although an in-depth discussion of the technical de-
tails of these efforts is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth taking a
few moments to provide a basic overview because it will inform our analysis
in Part II and the prescriptive recommendations advanced in Part III.
Facial recognition starts with acquiring two images.77 In most cases, one
image is attached to a verified identity. A second, comparator image is taken
for the purpose of, well, comparison. The major concern at the image capture
phase is image quality.78 Comparator images usually present the most signifi-
cant challenges. That is because most facial recognition programs have a
database of identified images that are taken under relatively controlled cir-
cumstances.79 That will certainly be the case for verification systems because
these programs gather and aggregate database images with the specific goal
of facilitating facial recognition. But identification systems also do pretty
well in terms of the quality of images in their databases because they choose
sources, such as driver’s license photos, passport pictures, and mugshots that
are taken under controlled circumstances.80 By contrast, comparator images
are gathered from different sources, in diverse lighting conditions, from a
variety of angles, and often in kinetic circumstances.81 This means that com-
parator images are usually of much lower quality82 and may result in errors.83
The second step of facial recognition entails detecting whether there is a
face in a comparator image and isolating any faces that appear.84 This is a
simple task for carbon-based facial recognition systems, but can pose a sig-
77. See id. (“Face recognition is the automated process of comparing two images
of faces to determine whether they represent the same individual.”).
78. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
79. Id. at 53–60.
80. Clearview AI is a notable exception to this rule because it rather indiscrimi-
nately scrapes publicly available images from the internet and social media to
aggregate its image database. Clearview AI is also distinct in that images in its
database are not necessarily identified. It instead operates by matching a com-
parator image to places where that same face has appeared. See Rebecca
Heilweil, The World’s Scariest Facial Recognition Company, Explained, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/11/21131991/clearview-ai-facial-recogni-
tion-database-law-enforcement (last updated May 8, 2020) (explaining how
Clearview AI works).
81. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 21, at 16–17.
82. Pei Li, Patrick J. Flynn, Loreto Prieto, & Domingo Mery, Face Recognition in
Low Quality Images: A Survey, 1 ACM COMP. SURV. 1, 3–5 (Apr. 2019).
83. Id. at 6.
84. Ashu Kumar, Amandeep Kaur & Munish Kumar, Face Detection Techniques:
A Review, 52 ARTIFICIAL INTEL. REV. 927, 928 (2018); see also Garvie et al.,
supra note 17 (“Before face recognition can identify someone, an algorithm
must first find that person’s face within the photo. This is called face
detection.”).
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nificant challenge for silicon-based systems, particularly when comparator
images are low-quality or visually complicated.85 Most facial recognition
systems use one or a combination of methods, trying to spot features that are
unique to faces or performing a base comparison to database images, identi-
fying things that look like faces by comparing things that might be faces to
things that are known to be faces.86 Image quality plays a role here as well,
but so, too, do efforts to alter or obscure facial features—there is a cottage
industry in facial recognition these days contending with ubiquitous mask-
wearing as part of our collective effort to combat SARS-CoV-2.87 Alterna-
tively, programs may miss the fact that there is a face in the frame or mis-
identify dummies, masks, paintings, or photographs as faces. The emerging
phenomenon of deep fakes and image morphing have added another layer of
challenge here, raising the possibility of spoofing facial recognition
technologies.88
The third step of facial recognition is feature extraction.89 This is where
a technology engages in its own version of Bertillonage, identifying and fo-
cusing on the features, landmarks, distances, and ratios that it will use to
draw comparisons between faces.90 This step ultimately creates a template
that is used during the feature comparison phase.91 For some systems, this
process is not much different from Bertillon’s approach—locate and measure
the nose; measure angle from tip of nose to eyes; measure distance between
85. Kumar et al., supra note 84, at 928–30.
86. Id. at 931.
87. See, e.g., Rebecca Heilweil, Masks Can Fool Facial Recognition Systems, But
the Algorithms are Learning Fast, VOX (July 28, 2020), https://www.vox.com/
recode/2020/7/28/21340674/face-masks-facial-recognition-surveillance-nist.
88. Pavel Korshunov & Sébastien Marcel, Vulnerability of Face Recognition to
Deep Morphing, CORNELL UNIV. ARXIV (Oct. 3, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1910.01933.pdf; MEI NGAN, PATRICK GROTHER, KAYEE HANAOKA & JASON
KUO, NISTIR 8292, DRAFT SUPPLEMENT: FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR
TEST (FRVT) PART 4: MORPH—PERFORMANCE OF AUTOMATED FACE MORPH
DETECTION, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/
reports/morph/frvt_morph_report.pdf (last updated Feb. 3, 2021). In 2019, re-
searchers at the Idiap Research Institute in Switzerland found that high quality
fakes, such as those created through the use of Generative Adversarial Net-
works, can fool facial recognition programs.
89. Yassin Kortli, Maher Jridi, Ayman Al Falou & Mohamed Atri, Face Recogni-
tion Systems: A Survey, 20 SENSORS 342 (Jan. 2020), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7013584/.
90. Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“[T]he algorithm extracts features from the face—
characteristics that can be numerically quantified, like eye position or skin
texture.”).
91. Kortli et al., supra note 89.
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eyes; etc.92 Most contemporary systems have moved past primitive biomet-
rics and instead use artificial intelligence, machine learning, and neural net-
works to recognize faces93 in ways as mysterious as we.94 But these
approaches require tremendous data storage capacity and computing power.
Another emerging concern at the feature extraction stage is the impact that
race, gender, and age have on the reliability of facial recognition technolo-
gies.95 We will return to this in a moment.
It all comes together in the comparison stage. This is where facial recog-
nition systems attempt to determine identities by comparing base images
with a comparator image. If the purpose of the system is to verify an individ-
ual’s identity, then the system will compare the extracted facial features to a
stored facial template.96 If the goal is to identify an individual, then the pro-
gram will systematically compare extracted features from the comparator im-
age with quantified descriptions of images on the database and run them
through a database library of images or use artificial intelligence to arrive at
an overall determination of identity.97 Finally, facial recognition technologies
assign a degree of certainty to comparisons.98 Different systems operate with
different probability thresholds before determining a positive match.
The primary concerns at these final stages of facial recognition are false
negatives and false positives. For example, an access control system might
erroneously deny an employee access to her workplace, or an immigration
verification system might deny a citizen reentry into her country.99 In most
cases, these mistakes are likely to be sorted out fairly quickly and would
have only temporary impact. Far more worrisome are false positives, which
92. Id.; see also Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“Many face recognition algorithms
figure out which features matter most through training. During training, an al-
gorithm is given pairs of face images of the same person. Over time, the al-
gorithm learns to pay more attention to the features that were the most reliable
signals that the two images contained the same person.”).
93. Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“The mathematical machinery behind a face rec-
ognition algorithm can include millions of variables that are optimized in the
process of training. This intricacy is what gives an algorithm the capacity to
learn, but it also makes it very difficult for a human to examine an algorithm or
generalize about its behavior.”).
94. Not all of us of course. See Oliver Sacks, Face-Blind, NEW YORKER (Aug. 23,
2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/30/face-blind.
95. See infra notes 101–112 and accompanying text.
96. Garvie et al., supra note 17.
97. Id.
98. Id. (“Finally, the algorithm examines pairs of faces and issues a numerical
score reflecting the similarity of their features. Face recognition is inherently
probabilistic: It does not produce binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, but rather iden-
tifies more likely or less likely matches.”).
99. See Hill, supra note 1.
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may result in unauthorized persons gaining access to secure areas or to cross
international borders. Worse still is the possibility of taking away someone’s
liberty due to a misidentification. The case of Robert Julian-Borchak Wil-
liams presents a stark example.100 Human intervenors can provide some addi-
tional reassurance by independently verifying a purported match, but, as Mr.
Williams’s case shows, we tend to rely on technology rather than our own
judgment in many circumstances. That kind of abdication is, of course, par-
ticularly tempting when a comparator image is low quality, in which case a
human user might assume that the technology has superior capacities to dis-
cern the undiscernible. Here again, one cannot help but think that this kind of
blind faith in oracular technology played a role in Mr. Williams’s case. How
else to explain investigating officers who trust a facial recognition match
over their own, well-practiced, human capacities to tell people apart?
But there is another important dimension to the Williams case: race.
Racial disparities are a pervasive feature of our criminal justice system from
street engagements between citizens and law enforcement101 all the way
through to the death penalty.102 Given that reality, it should come as no sur-
prise that facial recognition technologies exhibit a racial bias.103 This was
confirmed by a 2019 NIST study.104 For that study, investigators tested the
ability of almost two hundred algorithms to perform basic verification and
identification tasks.105 The study showed consistently higher error rates when
applied to non-white faces, generating as many as 100 times more false posi-
tives on both verification and identification when applied to African Ameri-
can, Native American, and Asian faces.106 The systems were also less reliable
when applied to women as compared to men, and older people as compared
100. See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Racial Disparities Remain, Despite Significant Decline in Stops, AM.
C.L. UNION (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/nyclu-re-
leases-report-analyzing-nypd-stop-and-frisk-data; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVES-
TIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 47–61 (2016).
102. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Struc-
tures in Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1395–96 (2016).
103. See LeBlanc, supra note 21. In fact, those background disparities may play a
causal role in promoting racial disparities in facial recognition because “due to
disproportionately high arrest rates, systems that rely on mug shot databases
likely include a disproportionate number of African Americans.” Garvie et al.,
supra note 17.
104. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
105. Id. at 25–27.
106. See Singer & Metz, supra note 21; LeBlanc, supra note 21.
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to folks in middle-age.107 These results confirmed prior studies, including one
performed by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.108
Given the history of Bertillonage and its association with eugenics and
race science, we ought to be very cautious in deploying any modern digital
equivalents that exhibit racial biases, putting people of color at higher risk of
false arrest or worse. To their credit, developers seem to have embraced the
social justice imperative at stake. Many top companies have hit pause on
deploying their systems for law enforcement purposes so they can address
racial disparities.109 One promising approach seems to be adding diversity to
the databases used to train the technology.110 As proof of concept, it appears
from the NIST study that technologies developed in China did not exhibit
racial bias when applied to Asian faces.111 Also promising is the fact that
rates of racial bias in facial technologies have and continue to decline as the
algorithms become more sophisticated.112
With this basic overview of facial recognition technologies and some of
the practical challenges they face, let us turn to the question whether the
Fourth Amendment has anything to say about whether and how these tools
can be used. We start where all Fourth Amendment analysis must start, with
the question whether using facial recognition constitutes a “search.”
II. SHOULD THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REGULATE FACIAL
RECOGNITION?
The threshold question in any Fourth Amendment analysis is whether
the actions of a government agent constitute a “search” or a “seizure.” The
U.S. Supreme Court has elaborated two primary tests for determining
whether government activity constitutes a “search.”113 The first, which traces
to the Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States, is whether a gov-
ernment agent intruded into a constitutionally protected area—a “person,
house, paper, or effect”—for purposes of gathering information114 in the ab-
107. See Singer & Metz, supra note 21.
108. See id.
109. See supra notes 31–32.
110. Will Knight, AI is Biased. Here’s How Scientists are Trying to Fix It, Wired
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-biased-how-scientists-trying-
fix/.
111. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 21, at 7.
112. Knight, supra note 110.
113. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
114. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928) (holding that there is
no Fourth Amendment “search” “unless there has been an official search and
seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material
effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose
of making a seizure.”). See also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013)
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sence of consent, whether expressed or implied.115 Alternatively, government
activities that intrude upon subjectively manifested expectations of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable may also constitute a
search,116 even if there is no physical intrusion involved.117 Applying these
two tests, the Court has held that there is no search or seizure involved when
government agents make observations from a lawful vantagepoint.118 Under
this “public observation doctrine,” the Court has held that officers’ tracking a
suspect’s movements in public spaces does not constitute a “search” for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment.119 Courts have also held that the use of
security cameras and closed-circuit surveillance systems deployed in public
spaces does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, even if they are trained on
constitutionally protected areas.120
(“When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on per-
sons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“The Government physically occupied private property
for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physi-
cal intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
115. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (“‘[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred,
that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave.’ As it
is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of their
companion’s firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension of
Jardines’ home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (even im-
plicitly) for them to do so. . . . ‘A license may be implied from the habits of the
country . . . .’”) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B.
1765)).
116. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”).
117. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (use of thermal detec-
tion device to gather information about activities in a home is a “search” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment even though use of the device does not
entail a physical intrusion into the home).
118. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (tracking a suspect on
public roads using a radio beeper is not a “search”); e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 453, 455 (1989) (observing constitutionally protected areas of the
home from public airspace is not a “search”).
119. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.
120. United States v. Moore-Bush, 381 F. Supp. 3d 139, 145 (D. Mass 2019); State
v. Anderson, No. 2018AP718-CR, 2019 WL 3294796, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App.
July 23, 2019); United States v. Tuggle, No. 16-cr-20070-JES-JEH, 2018 WL
3631881, at *3 (D.C. Ill. July 31, 2018); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 449–50 (1989) (holding that looking into constitutionally-protected areas
2021] Facial Recognition Technologies 19
Based on these precedents, there is good reason to believe that there
would be no Fourth Amendment impediment to the deployment and use of
facial recognition technology. So long as the technology is deployed in pub-
lic spaces, its deployment would not entail any physical intrusion into consti-
tutionally protected areas.121 Neither does it seem to intrude upon reasonable
expectations of privacy because the technology would do no more than ob-
serve what any member of the public might observe. The capacity to identify
particular individuals does not appear to change matters. We are anonymous
to many people we see in our daily travels through public places, but familiar
to others. We are of course recognized most often in workplaces and frequent
haunts,122 but anonymity is never a guarantee in other spaces. We have all
had the experience of being recognized by a friend, loved one, colleague, or
long-forgotten classmate while out and about.123 Given the possibility that a
real person might recognize us as we walk down the street or drive through
an intersection, facial recognition technology does not seem to pose any ad-
ditional threats to reasonable expectations of privacy—at least as the Court
has conventionally understood reasonable expectations of privacy.124 But
might there be grounds for abandoning or adapting the conventional view
when it comes to facial recognition technologies?
The Court recently gave us some reason to doubt this conventional anal-
ysis as it would apply to facial recognition technologies.125 In Carpenter v.
United States, the Court held that law enforcement officers must obtain a
from public spaces does not constitute a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
121. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the installa-
tion of a tracking device on a private vehicle constituted a “search” for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment because that installation entailed a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally-protected area for purposes of gathering
information).
122. See GARY PORTNOY, Where Everybody Knows Your Name (Cheers Theme)
(1982) (“Sometimes you wanna go where everybody knows your name and
they’re always glad you came. You wanna be where you can see our troubles
are all the same. You wanna be where everybody knows your name.”).
123. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It is one
thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a single
journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work.”); David Gray &
Danielle K. Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of
the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381,
412 (2013) (“We are all familiar with such happenstances, and at one point or
another have found ourselves driving the same roads with a fellow traveler for
miles and hours, or perhaps even briefly following someone who looks vaguely
familiar to determine whether they are, in fact, that person on whom we had a
crush in the eighth grade.”).
124. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–50; Anderson, 2019 WL 3294796, at *3.
125. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
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warrant before accessing cell site location data gathered and stored by
cellphone service providers.126 In that case, agents from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation were investigating Timothy Carpenter on suspicion that he
was involved in a series of armed robberies in Michigan and Ohio.127 As part
of their investigation, agents secured a court order issued under the Secured
Communications Act128 compelling Carpenter’s cellular service providers to
disclose several months’ cell site location data (CSLI) associated with his
accounts.129 By analyzing this information, agents were able to establish that
Carpenter—or, at least, Carpenter’s phone—was close to several of the rob-
beries.130 Although the Court was not entirely clear in Carpenter about when
the search occurred on these facts,131 it was firm in the conclusion that there
was a Fourth Amendment search and that a warrant requirement is the proper
tool for guaranteeing the security of the people against unreasonable searches
using cell site location data.132
The Carpenter Court recognized that its holding was in tension with its
precedents decided under the public observation doctrine.133 After all, the
location data agents sought in Carpenter would only document his move-
ments in public spaces in and around the locations of the armed robberies.134
Since he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his presence
in those public places, and there was no physical intrusion into a constitution-
ally protected area involved in the gathering of that information, it is hard to
see why the Fourth Amendment would have anything to say. The answer,
126. Id. at 2221.
127. Id. at 2212.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2019).
129. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
130. Id. at 2212–13.
131. Compare id. at 2217 (“The location information obtained from Carpenter’s
wireless carriers was the product of a search.”), with id. at 2220 (“The Govern-
ment’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”).
132. Id. at 2221.
133. Id. at 2215.
134. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)) (“[O]btaining by sense enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,’ constitutes a search.”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
714 (1984) (“[T]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not
open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who
have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”).
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according to the Court, lies in the nature of CSLI as a technology and the
fundamental role of the Fourth Amendment in our constitutional scheme.135
Before Carpenter, the signal Supreme Court case dealing with tracking
technologies was United States v. Knotts.136 There, the Court relied on the
public observation doctrine to hold that the use of a radio beeper tracking
device to monitor a suspect’s movements on public streets did not constitute
a “search” because a “person traveling in an automobile on public thorough-
fares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.”137 As the Court points out in Carpenter, the Knotts Court
was “careful to distinguish between the rudimentary tracking facilitated by
the [radio] beeper and more sweeping modes of surveillance . . . reserv[ing]
the question whether ‘different constitutional principles may be applicable’ if
‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] possi-
ble.’”138 In Carpenter, the Court makes explicit what was implied by that
reservation in Knotts, holding that people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the whole of their physical movements.139 The radio beeper track-
ing technology used in Knotts did not threaten that expectation because it
required active engagement by officers, which meant that “law enforcement
might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so ‘for any ex-
tended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely under-
taken.’”140 CSLI is different.
135. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; see Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 101–02
(arguing that the Court should shift its focus in Fourth Amendment on the
potential for new technologies to facilitate programs of broad and indiscrimi-
nate surveillance); see also id. at 132–33 (arguing that the public observation
doctrine should not extend to GPS-tracking and similar tracking technologies
because they are capable of facilitating programs of broad and indiscriminate
surveillance).
136. 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
137. Id. at 281–82.
138. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84).
139. Id. at 2219; see also David Gray, The Fourth Amendment Categorical Impera-
tive, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 14, 34–35 (2017) (“Looking through CSLI
records, using CSLI to look for an effect, and using CSLI to make inquiry or
look for a person are all searches by any ordinary definition.”); Gray & Citron,
supra note 45, at 71–72 (“[T]he threshold Fourth Amendment question should
be whether a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate
surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy
by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that
technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or
other government agents.”).
140. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)); see also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at
132 (“The beeper technology used in Knotts was simply incapable of broad and
indiscriminate surveillance. It could only provide directional information, not a
22 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXIV
Unlike the beeper technology used in Knotts, the Carpenter Court held
that cell site tracking threatens reasonable expectations of privacy in the
whole of our movements.141 That is because it “provides an all-encompassing
record of the holder’s whereabouts.”142 It also “provides an intimate window
into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through
them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associa-
tions.’”143 Belying its power as a means of conducting surveillance, the Court
noted that cell site location is “remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient,”144 so
CSLI is not only “detailed, [and] encyclopedic, [but also] effortlessly com-
piled.”145 This is particularly concerning, the Court noted, in light of the fact
that cellular phones are ubiquitous (there are “396 million cell phone service
suspect’s precise location. To be of any use at all, the beepers used in Knotts
needed to be in close proximity to a dedicated radio receiver. Because no stable
network of these receivers existed, officers had to follow the beepers, and
hence the suspects, to track them. This beeper technology was thus little more
than an adjunct to traditional human surveillance and therefore labored under
the same practical limitations. That is why the Knotts Court ultimately held that
the beeper technology used in that case ‘raise[d] no constitutional issues which
visual surveillance would not also raise.’”).
141. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18; see also Gray, supra note 139, at 35 (“As the
Fourth Amendment categorical imperative reveals, new and emerging tracking
and surveillance technologies like CSLI are entirely different in terms of the
threats they pose to the security of the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures. That is because these technologies are powerful, scalable, and
cheap.”); Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 132 (“GPS-enabled tracking tech-
nology used in Jones and other technologies that threaten quantitative privacy
are materially different . . . GPS-enabled technology provides second-by-sec-
ond location data . . . GPS is precise, highly scalable, and increasingly inexpen-
sive . . . unlike the beeper technology . . . used in Knotts [that] came with
inherent constraints that limited its ability to facilitate broad programs of indis-
criminate surveillance. The GPS technology used in Jones suffers no such
limitations.”).
142. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 102
((“[F]actors that a court would need to consider are: (1) the inherent scope of a
technology’s surveillance capabilities, be they narrow or broad; (2) the technol-
ogy’s scale and scalability . . . .”).
143. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
144. Id. at 2217–18; see also Gray, supra note 139, at 35 (“[N]ew and emerging
tracking and surveillance technologies like CSLI are entirely different in terms
of the threats they pose to the security of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures. That is because these technologies are powerful, scala-
ble, and cheap.”); Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 102 (citing costs associated
with deploying and using the technology); id. at 133 (“GPS is precise, highly
scalable, and increasingly inexpensive.”).
145. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 102
(pointing out that the scope of a surveillance technologies capabilities and
2021] Facial Recognition Technologies 23
accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people”)146 and
people “compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time” as if they
were “‘a feature of [their] anatomy.’”147 “Accordingly, when the Govern-
ment tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance,
as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”148 And,
“[c]ritically, because location information is continually logged for all of the
400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons
who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound tracking ca-
pacity runs against everyone.”149
But why does all of this matter from a Fourth Amendment point of
view? To answer that question, the Carpenter Court returned to history and
first principles.150 As the Court noted, “[t]he Founding generation crafted the
Fourth Amendment as a ‘response’ to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and
‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to
rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal
activity.”151 “In fact, as John Adams recalled, the patriot James Otis’s 1761
“costs associated with deployment and use” are relevant when assessing its
Fourth Amendment status).
146. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
147. Id. at 2218.
148. Id.; see also Gray, supra note 139, at 36 (“[T]hese features of CSLI mean that
it has the immediate capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveil-
lance.”); Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 102 (“If a court finds that a chal-
lenged technology is capable of broad and indiscriminate surveillance by its
nature, or is sufficiently inexpensive and scalable so as to present no practical
barrier against its broad and indiscriminate use, then granting law enforcement
unfettered access to that technology would violate reasonable expectations of
quantitative privacy.”).
149. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see also id. (“[P]olice need not even know in
advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when. Whoever
the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of
every day for five years, and the police may—in the Government’s view—call
upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless
and absolute surveillance.”); Gray, supra note 139, at 35 (“CSLI is an ex-
tremely powerful search tool that allows searches for persons and their effects
anytime, even in the past.”); Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 144 (concluding
that the Fourth Amendment should regulate access to technologies that enable
the “monitoring of everyone all the time”).
150. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14.
151. Id. at 2213; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 70 (“Before America’s
founding, British agents routinely abused general warrants, including writs of
assistance, to subject our forefathers to the eighteenth-century equivalent of a
surveillance state. The Fourth Amendment responded to these abuses by limit-
ing the right of law enforcement to effect physical searches and seizures and
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speech condemning writs of assistance was ‘the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain’ and helped spark the Revolution itself.”152
Based on this history, the Court concluded that “the [Fourth] Amendment
seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’” and “‘to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’”153 “In
light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and compre-
hensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection,” the
Carpenter Court concluded, “grant[ing] the state unrestricted access to a
wireless carrier’s database of physical location information” “risks Govern-
ment encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the lessons of
history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”154
Although the Court was careful in Carpenter to limit its holding to
CSLI, it provides a framework for evaluating the Fourth Amendment status
of other new and emerging surveillance technologies.155 Specifically, Car-
the authority of politically driven legislatures and executives to license pro-
grams of broad and indiscriminate search.”).
152. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 93–94
(“The Fourth Amendment drew on these historical experiences to describe lim-
itations on ‘the amount of power that [our society] permits its police to use
without effective control by law.’ During the colonial period, British officials
and their representatives took advantage of writs of assistance and other gen-
eral warrants, which immunized them from legal liability for their invasions, in
order to search anyone they pleased, anywhere they pleased, without having to
specify cause or reason. James Otis, who famously vacated his office as Gen-
eral when solicited to defend writs of assistance, described general warrants in
a 1761 court argument as ‘the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
was found in an English law book.’ Among those in the audience for Otis’s
speech was a young attorney named John Adams, who would later be a princi-
pal contributor to the text of the Fourth Amendment.”).
153. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)); see also Gray &
Citron, supra note 45, at 95 (“Although the negative rights afforded by the
Fourth Amendment have specific historical antecedents, the text itself evinces a
broader historical purpose to protect against indiscriminate and invasive gov-
ernmental practices that are characteristic of a surveillance state.”).
154. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 103
(“The Fourth Amendment guards against the government’s unfettered use of
techniques and technologies that raise the specter of a surveillance state. For
our forebears, those fears arose in reaction to the broad and indiscriminate use
of physically invasive searches and seizures. Today, the risk of a surveillance
state arises with law enforcement’s unfettered access to advanced surveillance
technologies, including aerial drones, GPS-enabled tracking devices, and data
aggregation and mining projects like DAS, fusion centers, and NSA’s tele-
phonic and data surveillance programs.”).
155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18, 2223.
2021] Facial Recognition Technologies 25
penter instructs us to focus on the technology at issue, to ask about the extent
to which the information it gathers might reveal intimate details about our
lives,156 including our associations and activities,157 the “retrospective quality
of the data,”158 whether the data can be “store[d] and efficiently mine[d] for
information years into the future,”159 whether the technology can be scaled-
up easily, facilitating “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” such as
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country,”160 whether the
technology “by design, proceeds surreptitiously,”161 and whether the deploy-
ment and use of the technology “evades the ordinary checks that constrain
abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and community
hostility.”162 The Court’s analysis of those factors leads to its holding that
unregulated access to CSLI163 threatens our reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy in the “whole of our physical movements.”164
156. Id. at 2217; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 101–25 (elaborating this
“technology-centered” approach).
157. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
158. Id.
159. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[T]he retrospective quality of the data
here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In
the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth
of records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the Govern-
ment can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject
only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers . . . .”).
160. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983); see also Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring))
(“‘[S]ociety’s expectation . . . that law enforcement agents and others would
not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and cata-
logue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period’ . . .
Allowing government access to cell-site records contravenes that expecta-
tion.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (contending that
technologies that are “cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance tech-
niques” may raise Fourth Amendment concerns); Gray & Citron, supra note
45, at 75, 90 (explaining the Fourth Amendment significance of technology
costs and scalability).
161. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Carpenter, 138 S.
Ct. at 2217 (quoting with approval Justice Sotomayor’s assertion in Jones
about society’s expectation on law enforcement secret monitoring).
162. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting with approval Justice Sotomayor’s as-
sertion in Jones about society’s expectation on law enforcement secret
monitoring).
163. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
164. Id. at 2219.
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So, what does Carpenter teach us about the Fourth Amendment status
of facial recognition technologies? The answer depends somewhat on the
way the technology would be deployed and used. Discrete uses, such as veri-
fying identity at immigration checkpoints or running an image captured at a
crime scene through a database to identify a specific criminal suspect caught
on a surveillance camera, might not implicate the Fourth Amendment under
either a conventional analysis or the approach modeled in Carpenter.
On a conventional analysis, these discrete uses of facial recognition
technology entail gathering information disclosed to the public, the use of
information that is voluntarily shared with third parties,165 or both. For exam-
ple, facial recognition used at immigration entry points involves cameras
making observations in public places and comparing those observations to
images voluntarily shared with the Department of State when securing a
passport or visa.166 Facial recognition technology used to identify a criminal
suspect whose image was caught on a security camera would involve re-
corded observations of conduct in a public place—or, at the very least, a
place where the criminal suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy—and would compare those images against a database of images vol-
untarily shared with public agencies, such as a department of motor vehi-
cles.167 In either case, the use of facial recognition technology would not
entail physical intrusions into constitutionally protected areas or violations of
reasonable expectations of privacy.168
The result appears to be the same under the analytic framework adopted
in Carpenter. Both of these examples involve discrete uses of facial recogni-
tion technology.169 They, therefore, do not threaten to disclose the whole of
someone’s physical movements.170 Neither would they facilitate the kinds of
165. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (observing constitutionally
protected areas of the home from public airspace is not a “search”); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (tracking a
suspect on public roads using a radio beeper is not a “search”).
166. Say Hello to the New Face of Speed, Security, and Safety: Introducing Biomet-
ric Facial Comparison, supra note 35.
167. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ICE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SER-
VICES, supra note 33.
168. Compare Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–50 (observing constitutionally protected areas
of the home from public airspace is not a “search”), with Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 512 (1961)) (“[O]btaining by sense enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a
search.”).
169. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284–85 (empha-
sizing that the limited use of a beeper by the government during an “automo-
tive journey” was discrete).
170. Cf. id. at 2219.
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broad and indiscriminate surveillance that implicates Fourth Amendment
protections against grants of “arbitrary power” and “too permeating police
surveillance.”171 Of course, there is no reason to think that facial recognition
technology would be deployed and used so parsimoniously.
Contemporary conversations about surveillance technologies often are
informed by science fiction. For example, George Orwell’s 1984 is a familiar
trope in debates about surveillance.172 These references are useful not only
for making visceral and immediate some threats to privacy and liberty that
may otherwise seem abstract and remote, but also because they can provide
us with a window into potential futures—challenging us to decide what
world we want for ourselves. When it comes to facial recognition technol-
ogy, one possible future is depicted in the 2002 film Minority Report.173
Based on a short story by Philip K. Dick, the movie follows protagonist John
Anderton, who is an officer in a unit charged with arresting individuals based
on predictions of future crimes rendered by a group of prognosticators called
“Precogs.”174 Anderton goes on the lam after he becomes a target of his own
unit when the Precogs predict that he will commit a murder.175 In one vivid
scene, his efforts to escape are thwarted by a dense network of cameras capa-
ble of identifying passersby using retinal scans.176 Some of these cameras are
deployed for public safety and crime control purposes, but many are attached
to advertisement signs and linked to consumer databases.177 This allows ad-
vertisers to target their offers to Anderton or anyone else who happens to be
walking by—kind of like Google ads in the real world.178 In one scene, a
holographic greeter asks Anderton how a recent tank-top purchase is working
out.179
Minority Report presents us with a dystopian vision of a world in which
a dense net of biometric identification technology makes it impossible for
anyone to move anonymously through public spaces.180 Because the cameras
are networked, the technology also provides a detailed accounting of individ-
171. Id. at 2214.
172. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Orwell’s 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveil-
lance Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1865 (2017).
173. Clarisse Loughrey, Minority Report: 6 Predictions That Came True, 15 Years








179. Loughrey, supra note 173.
180. Id.
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uals’ movements through public spaces.181 Facial recognition technology has
the same potential to facilitate close monitoring of everyone’s movements
through public spaces.182 Linked networks of surveillance cameras increas-
ingly is the norm.183 Most police agencies have their own surveillance net-
works184 but also have access to cameras and networks operated by private
institutions185 and even private persons.186 Although a combination of techni-
cal challenges, including variations in image quality, bandwidth, computer
power, and image databases, make it a challenge to run all of these feeds
through facial recognition filters, that day is not far off.187 In fact, Clearview
AI has proposed using this kind of program to conduct contact tracing and
enforce quarantine orders.188 At any rate, the Court has made clear that we
must fashion Fourth Amendment rules that are not limited by present tech-
nologies, but “take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in
use or in development.”189 With that guidance in mind, we should ask serious
questions about whether facial recognition technology would violate our rea-
sonable expectations of privacy if it were deployed widely, accessed images
from a wide range of sources deployed across a broad diversity of public
spaces, and constantly identified individuals on an automatic basis.190 In
short, we must ask whether the Fourth Amendment can protect us against
what was once science fiction, but is now, or soon will be, everyday fact.
There can be little doubt that broadly deployed facial recognition tech-
nology would violate our reasonable expectations of privacy in the whole of
181. Id.
182. Id.




186. See Drew Harwell, Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring has Partnered with 400 Police
Forces, Extending Surveillance Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019, 4:53
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-cam-
era-firm-ring-has-partnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/
(describing how police access footage from home surveillance systems).
187. See Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“Contract documents and agency statements
show that at least five major police departments—including agencies in Chi-
cago, Dallas, and Los Angeles—either claimed to run real-time face recogni-
tion off of street cameras, bought technology that can do so, or expressed a
written interest in buying it. Nearly all major face recognition companies offer
real-time software.”).
188. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
189. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218–19 (2018) (quoting Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
190. Id. at 2218–19.
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our public movements. As the technology improves, it will be relatively
cheap and easy to scale-up the deployment and use of facial recognition. By
design and in practice, it does and will operate surreptitiously, evading the
normal checks on the abusive use of police powers, including limited re-
sources and public scrutiny. Much like CSLI, these networks would docu-
ment intimate details about our lives, including where we go, with whom we
associate, and a wide range of our activities.191 In fact, this threat would be
more acute in the case of facial recognition technology than it is with CSLI.
That is because we can choose not to own or not to carry a cellular phone.192
Not so our faces. In addition, and again in parallel with CSLI, information
gathered by widespread facial recognition technologies would be easy to
store and mine in the future, allowing those with access not only to follow us
in real time, but to trace our movements back in time.193 As a consequence,
granting government agents unfettered discretion to deploy and use facial
recognition technology would be akin to granting general warrants and writs
of assistance, raising the specter of a surveillance state by licensing “too per-
meating police surveillance,” marking an “encroachment of the sort the
Framers, after consulting the lessons of history, drafted the Fourth Amend-
ment to prevent.”194
Facial recognition technology appears to check all the boxes the Court
ticked off in Carpenter on its way to holding that affording law enforcement
unfettered access to cell site location information violates reasonable expec-
tations of privacy.195 But there is a simpler path: we could just take seriously
the text and history of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we could deter-
mine whether the deployment and use of facial recognition technology would
constitute a “search” under the original public meaning of the text and then
ask whether granting government agents unfettered discretion to deploy and
use this technology would threaten the right to be secure against unreasona-
ble searches guaranteed to the people by the Fourth Amendment.196
The use of facial recognition technology either as part of a broader sys-
tem of networked surveillance technologies or to facilitate discrete investiga-
tive goals would constitute a “search” by any reasonable definition, whether
eighteenth century or modern. “Search” had much the same meaning in 1792
as it does today, including efforts “[t]o examine; to explore; to look through”
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2218 (“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and
absolute surveillance.”).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2223 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
195. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
196. DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 251
(2017).
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and “[t]o make inquiry” or “[t]o seek; to try to find.”197 On this definition,
efforts to look for or try to find a person, whether in their home, their office,
or even on public streets, would constitute a “search.”198 Founding-era
sources, including justice of the peace manuals, reflect this commonsense
conclusion.199 So, too, contemporary semantic instincts—there is nothing odd
or unfamiliar at all about phrases like “I’m searching for my spouse in the
Target” or “I’m searching for Waldo in this picture.” On this straightforward
definition, looking for persons using a surveillance network equipped with
facial recognition technology or using facial recognition technology to iden-
tify someone by examining photographs and looking through image
databases would both qualify as “searches” under the plain language of the
Fourth Amendment—no need to perform doctrinal backflips to avoid doctri-
nal pitfalls.200
197. Search, in SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th
ed. 1792). Justice Scalia has identified Johnson as an “authoritative” source for
the meaning of words in the Constitution. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 419 (2012);
see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (citing and
relying on JOHNSON, supra. See also GRAY, supra note 196, at 251; Gray, supra
note 139, at 34–35.
198. GRAY, supra note 196, at 158–60.
199. See, e.g., THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHOR-
ITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS,
CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 187–88
(1792) (providing that “upon hue and cry levied against any person, or where
any hue and cry comes to a constable, whether the person be certain or uncer-
tain, the constable may search suspected places within his vill[age] for the ap-
prehending of the felons”); WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES OF CONSTABLES,
CHURCH WARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, SUPRAVISORS OF THE HIGH-
WAYES, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY-STOCK; AND SOME LESSER COUNTREY
OFFICERS PLAINLY AND LIVELY SET FORTH ch. 8, § 2 (“An Action of Trespass
was brought by a man for an Assault and Battery of his Servant, whereby he
did lose his service three dayes, and the Defendant pleaded that A was robbed
at midnight of Goods to the value of two pounds, whereupon the said A came
to the Constable, and prayed him to search for the suspicious persons, and to
apprehend and arrest them; and accordingly he did search, and found the same
servant walking suspiciously in the street in the night . . . .”); id. (“And this
Officer receiving a Hue and Cry after a Fellon, must, with all speed, make
diligent pursuit, with Horse and Foot, after the offendors from Town to Town
the way it is sent, and make diligent search in his own Town . . . .”). See also
WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 322 (2009) (discussing early eighteenth-century cases of searches for
“Rogues, Vagabonds, sturdy Beggars, and disorderly Persons apprehended by
virtue of search Warrants in Night Houses and other disorderly Houses or such
as infest the Streets in the Night-time”).
200. The whole notion that a search is not a search traces to Katz, after all. GRAY,
supra note 196, at 159–60.
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This more straightforward approach would still leave open the question
whether granting law enforcement officers unfettered discretion to deploy
and use facial recognition technologies threatens the security of the people
against unreasonable searches.201 On this question, the Court’s rehabilitation
of founding-era concerns about grants of arbitrary power tracing to eight-
eenth century experiences with general warrants and writs of assistance is
helpful and instructive.202 To see why, let us again consider the text, which
guarantees that “the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.” Eighteenth century readers
would have understood “unreasonable” similarly to how we understand it
today:203 as “[n]ot agreeable to reason,”204 “[e]xorbitant; claiming or insisting
on more than is fit,” or “[g]reater than is fit; immoderate.”205 As the Court
recognized in Carpenter, the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures”
would have been read as a reference to general warrants and writs of assis-
tance, which granted government agents broad, unfettered authority to search
anywhere they liked for good reasons, for bad reasons, or for no reasons at
all without fear of legal consequence.206 By contrast, a search conducted pur-
suant to a lawful warrant issued by a judicial officer based on probable cause
that described with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be
seized was generally considered “reasonable” precisely because that process
guaranteed that searches would be conducted for good and sufficient reasons
201. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (recognizing that
the fundamental question is whether “to grant the state unrestricted access to a
wireless carrier’s database of physical location in formation.”); United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (noting that courts must “consider the
appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight
from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of
the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power [and
to] prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See also GRAY, supra
note 196, at 157–58 (pointing out that “to be secure” in the Fourth Amendment
refers to general warrants, writs of assistance, and their grants of unfettered
discretion to search).
202. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
203. For example, Merriam-Webster defines “unreasonable” as “not governed by or
acting according to reason,” “not conformable to reason,” or “exceeding the
bounds of reason or moderation.” Unreasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unreasonable [https://perma.cc/4XXV-
54EE].
204. JOHNSON, supra note 197. Johnson defined “reason” as “[t]he power by which
man deduces one proposition from another, or proceeds from premises to con-
sequences,” “[r]ight; justice,” or “[m]oderation.” Id.
205. Id.
206. GRAY, supra note 196, at 160–65; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 776–81 (1994).
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and pursuant to a limited license that constrained the discretion of those con-
ducting a search.207
This leads us to the question of security. In 1792, as now, “to be secure”
would have been understood as a condition “free from fear” or “danger.”208
Thus, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that “the people,” collectively,209
have the absolute right to live free from fear that they will be subjected to
207. See GRAY, supra note 196, at 160–65; Laura K. Donohue, Original Fourth
Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1270–71 (2016); Amar, supra note 206,
at 776–81. This reading is reinforced later in the text where we are told that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. After all, what is the requirement
to show “probable cause” but a demand for good and sufficient reasons? Why
require an “Oath or affirmation” if not to submit those reasons to formal, inde-
pendent evaluation? And why require particularity if not to limit the discretion
of government agents when conducting searches and seizures?
208. JOHNSON, supra note 197; see also GRAY, supra note 196, at 157–58; Luke M.
Milligan, The Forgotten Right to be Secure, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 713, 740,
749–50 (2014). Merriam-Webster defines “secure” as “free from danger.” Se-
cure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/se-
cure [https://perma.cc/57ML-9X74].
209. According to the text, the Fourth Amendment protects “the people,” not “per-
sons.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. That choice indicates a founding-era recogni-
tion that Fourth Amendment rights have an important collective dimension. See
GRAY, supra note 196, at 144–56; David Gray, Fourth Amendment Rights as
Remedies: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B.U. L. REV. 425, 444–56 (2016);
David Gray, Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181, 1184–203
(2015); Richard H. McAdams, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring
and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 318 (1985).
That conclusion is evidenced by the fact that this choice of words marked a
departure from parallel protections against unreasonable search and seizure in
contemporary state constitutions. For example, both the Massachusetts and
New Hampshire constitutions guaranteed the right of “every subject” to be se-
cure against unreasonable searches and seizures. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX
(amended 1792); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV. Eighteenth century readers
could not have missed the significance of this choice, particularly in light of the
important role of John Adams and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights on
the Fourth Amendment. See GRAY, supra note 196, at 147–56 (discussing sig-
nificance of “the people” as compared to “every subject”); CUDDIHY, supra
note 199, at 729 (identifying the Pennsylvania Constitution as the origin of the
phrase “the right of the people” in the Fourth Amendment). Readers at the time
would have read this as a reference to the same “people” acting in the Preamble
to form a more perfect union and whose rights are protected by the First, Sec-
ond, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments—namely “the People of the United
States.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1990)
(contrasting “the people” with “the words ‘person’ and ‘accused’ used in the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating procedures in criminal cases.”).
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arbitrary search and seizure at the despotic whim of an executive agent.210
This, of course, is precisely the threat posed by general warrants and writs of
assistance.211
General warrants and writs of assistance were not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized.212 They instead provided
general authority for executive agents or their designees to search anywhere
they liked. Worse still, executive agents could issue general warrants on their
own authority, circumventing judicial review.213 In fact, the warrants under
scrutiny in Entick v. Carrington, one of the famed general warrants cases,
which has been described by the Supreme Court “as a monument of English
freedom, undoubtedly familiar to every American statesman at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate expres-
sion of constitutional law with regard to search and seizure,”214 were issued
under the authority of Secretary of State, George Montagu-Dunk, the Second
Earl of Halifax. As a result, general warrants provided government agents
with virtually unlimited authority to search wherever they pleased without
need of justifying their conduct by good and sufficient reasons.215 In fact,
210. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
211. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Riley v. Califor-
nia, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (discussing how the Fourth Amendment “was
the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs
of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage
through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”).
212. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
213. See Amar, supra note 206, at 772–73.
214. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626
(1886)).
215. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763) (general warrants license
searches “without any information or charge”); see also James Otis, In Opposi-
tion to Writs of Assistance, in THE WORLD’S FAMOUS ORATIONS 27–37 (Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan ed., 1906) (discussing how general warrants justify
searches and seizures on nothing more than “[b]are suspicion without oath”
allowing “[e]very one with this writ may be a tyrant . . . accountable to no
person for his doings. Every man may reign secure in his petty tyranny . . . .”);
Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 453 (1806) (a warrant issued for
“want of stating some good cause certain, supported by oath” is unconstitu-
tional) (emphasis omitted). Under eighteenth century common law, those
targeted for searches or seizures could compel those who conducted the search
or seizure to justify himself by providing good and sufficient reasons for his
actions in a court. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B.).
Warrants, including general warrants, provided immunity against suits in tres-
pass, effectively excusing bearers the duty of justifying their conduct after the
fact. Amar, supra note 206, at 774–78. General warrants and writs of assistance
also did not provide for procedural review such as requiring agents to keep an
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general warrants licensed searches conducted for bad reasons216 or no reasons
at all while also providing broad immunity from civil actions.217
So, a search conducted under the authority of a general warrant provides
the paradigm case of an unreasonable search.218 By contrast, a search con-
ducted under the authority of a specific warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate based “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized”219 provides the paradigm example of a reasonable
search.220 That is because general warrants are, well, general! By definition,
they do not specify the places to be searched or the items to be seized.221
They therefore leave the decision to search to the unfettered discretion of
executive agents unmediated by any process of reason-giving or judicial re-
view.222 That is the very definition of “arbitrary power.” As with any grant of
inventory of papers or property they seized. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 8 Eng.
Rep. 489, 498–99 (C.P.).
216. See Otis, supra note 215, at 32 (noting that “[e]very man prompted by revenge,
ill humor, or wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s house, may get
a writ of assistance”). Another founding-era commentator similarly warned that
“if magistrates had a power of arresting men . . . merely upon their own suspi-
cions, or pretended suspicions, they might cause any person, how innocent so-
ever, to be thrown into prison whenever they thought fit.” FRANCIS MASERES,
THE CANADIAN FREEHOLDER: IN THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN AN ENGLISHMAN
AND A FRENCHMAN, SETTLED IN CANADA 246 (1779).
217. Amar, supra note 206, at 774–78.
218. See, e.g., Money v. Leach (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088 (K.B.) (“[A]n un-
certain warrant [is] void: and there is no case or book to the contrary.”);
Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769 (concluding the same); Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at
498–99 (concluding the same).
219. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
220. GRAY, supra note 196, at 170.
221. See Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768; Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99.
222. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99 (general warrants provide “a discretionary
power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to
fall”); Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B.) (general war-
rants leave “to the discretion of these defendants” the decision to search);
Money, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088 (“It is not fit, that the receiving or judging of the
information should be left to the discretion of the officer.”); see also Opinion of
Attorney General De Grey upon Writs of Assistance, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.)
(“[I]t will be unconstitutional to lodge such Writ in the Hands of the Officer, as
it will give him a discretionary Power to act under it in such Manner as he shall
think necessary.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 291–92 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1826) (“[I]t is the duty of the magistrate,
and ought not to be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion.”).
Justice Jackson would later reprise these themes in Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948), where he famously pointed out that
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unchecked power, general warrants open the door to abuse,223 leaving “the
people” to live in a state of insecurity against the threat of unreasonable
searches.224 The general warrants cases provide a good example of how such
broad grants of unfettered power are “inimical to a democratic society.”225
After all, the executive agents in those cases used their power to search and
seize as tools to target and suppress political dissent.226 On this side of the
Atlantic, James Otis levied similar criticisms of general warrants in Paxton’s
Case.227 In a speech later lauded as “the first scene of the first act of opposi-
tion to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain,”228 Otis warned against granting
The point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped by zealous
officers is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer-
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magis-
trate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime. [Footnote 3] Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people’s
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Id.
223. Otis, supra note 215, at 30–32 (“Every one with this writ may be a tyrant,” and
“may reign secure in [their] petty tyranny, and spread terror and desolation
around [them], until the trump of the archangel shall excite different emotions
in [their] soul[s] . . . and whether they break through malice or revenge, no
man, no court can inquire.”); see also id. (“Every man prompted by revenge, ill
humor, or wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s house, may get a
writ of assistance. Others will ask it from self-defense; one arbitrary exertion
will provoke another, until society be involved in tumult and in blood.”).
224. See Donohue, supra note 207, at 1270, 1319 (discussing how general warrants
granted arbitrary powers that were “unreasonable” to the Framers, being
“against the reason of the common law,” and had oppressive impact on the
people as a whole); Milligan, supra note 208, at 738–50 (discussing how the
Fourth Amendment conferred on the people a right to be “free from fear” of
unreasonable searches). In Wilkes v. Wood, the court condemned this kind of
general power to search as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”
Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. James Otis famously denounced writs of assis-
tance as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power,” placing “the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer.” Otis, supra note 215, at 28–29.
225. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
226. See CUDDIHY, supra note 199, at 122–23; Donohue, supra note 207, at
1208–10; Milligan, supra note 208, at 749.
227. GRAY, supra note 196, at 70; CUDDIHY, supra note 199, at 377–95.
228. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (quoting Letter from John
Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in 10 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 244, 248 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856)).
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executive agents broad discretionary powers to search and seize229 in the ab-
sence of judicial review.230
The mere existence of general warrants and writs of assistance
threatened the security of our eighteenth century forebears, forcing every-
one231 to live in fear that they might at any moment be the victim of arbitrary
executive power.232 As the court in one of the general warrants cases put the
point, granting “discretionary power . . . to messengers to search wherever
their suspicions may chance to fall . . . certainly may affect the person and
property of every man in this kingdom.”233 In another of these cases, the
court warned that general warrants “would destroy all the comforts of soci-
ety.”234 In a third, the court criticized executive agents for “exercising arbi-
trary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of
229. See Otis, supra note 215, at 30 (condemning general warrants for granting a
license to “imprison, or murder anyone within the realm” whom government
agents might choose as a target); see also Mark Graber, Seeing, Seizing, and
Searching Like a State: Constitutional Developments from the Seventeenth
Century to the End of the Nineteenth Century, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
SURVEILLANCE LAW 395, 406 (David Gray & Stephen Henderson eds., 2017)
(“Americans believed that government by administrators was arbitrary govern-
ment inconsistent with the constitutional principles of rule by law. General
warrants and excise searches were intimate parts of this conspiracy against re-
publican government that Americans eventually concluded justified separation
from Great Britain.”).
230. Otis, supra note 215, at 29 (general warrants put “the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer,” by allowing officers to “enter our houses
when they please,” exercising unchecked “arbitrary power”); see also THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (condemning King
George III for “erect[ing] a multitude of New Offices, and sen[ding] hither
swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.”).
231. See, e.g., 1 THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 387 (2d ed. Jonathan Elliot ed., 1937)
(1836) (quoting Luther Martin as warning against general warrants’ allowing
government officials to “examine into your private concerns”).
232. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 366 (1974) (“[T]he primary abuse thought to characterize the
general warrants and the writs of assistance was their indiscriminate quality,
the license that they gave to search Everyman without particularized cause, the
fact that they were—as Wilkes proclaimed Lord Halifax’s warrant for the au-
thors and publishers of No. 45 of the North Briton—‘a ridiculous warrant
against the whole English nation.’” (quoting 2 THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND SINCE THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE
THIRD 247 (1864)).
233. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 8 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (C.P.).
234. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B.).
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the kingdom, by insisting upon the legality of this general warrant . . . .”235 In
a similar vein, James Otis condemned general warrants as “the worst instru-
ment of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fun-
damental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book.”236
He was not alone in this view among our founders. Elbridge Gerry railed
against general warrants as “a detestable instrument of arbitrary power” that
licensed “capricious house searches by insolent officers of the new central
government.”237 The Sons of Liberty, headed by Samuel Adams, complained
that general warrants allowed “our bed chambers . . . to be searched by brutal
tools of power . . . .”238 Patrick Henry condemned general warrants as li-
censes to search “in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or rea-
son” leaving “the most sacred” to be “ransacked by the strong hand of
power.”239 Those concerns lasted through the nineteenth240 and twentieth241
centuries, providing a clear and consistent historical reference for the Car-
penter Court’s criticism of technologies capable of facilitating programs of
broad and indiscriminate surveillance.
There can be no doubt that facial recognition technologies pose real
dangers to these core Fourth Amendment values. Clearview’s recent propos-
als to use facial recognition to facilitate contact tracing and quarantine en-
235. Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P.).
236. Otis, supra note 215, at 28.
237. Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and
State Conventions (Boston, n. pub. 1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 13 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,1888);
CUDDIHY, supra note 199, at 677.
238. A Son of Liberty, N.Y. J. (Nov. 8, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 481, 481 (John P. Ka-
minski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981).
239. 3 THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 231, at 588.
240. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“The struggles
against arbitrary power in which [the Founders] had been engaged for more
than twenty years, would have been too deeply engraved in their memories to
have allowed them to approve of such insidious disguises of the old grievance
which they had so deeply abhorred.”); Grummon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 43
(Conn. 1814) (allowing general warrants would leave “every citizen of the
United States within the jurisdiction . . . liable to be arrested and carried before
the justice for trial.”).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“But the forefa-
thers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some
criminals from punishment.”).
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forcement during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic provides a prime example.242
What could be more threatening to the liberty or more threatening of arbi-
trary government power than a technology capable of identifying us wher-
ever we are, or were, and tracking us wherever we go, or have been?
Notably, the result of this analysis is the same even if law enforcement
only wants to use facial recognition for a discrete investigation. Although
that particular use may not, of itself, threaten the security of the people,
neither would a single search conducted under the authority of a general war-
rant. The point made by founding-era courts and commentators was that the
very existence of general warrants threatened the security of the people. If
agents could conduct searches or seizures at their arbitrary whim, then that
left everyone to live in a state of fear that they would be subjected to an
unreasonable search or seizure. Any instance of search or seizure sanctioned
by a general warrant, though particular, stood for that general threat.243 So
too would granting government agents unfettered access to facial recognition
technology. As we shall see in Part III, discrete uses may well be reasonable,
but only if they are subject to Fourth Amendment regulation rather than the
whims of executive agents.
III. REGULATING FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES
So, what does this mean for facial recognition technologies? The Fourth
Amendment prohibits grants of broad and unfettered discretion to search and
seize akin to those made by general warrants and writs of assistance because
they threaten the right of each of us and all of us, “the people,” to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures.244 To allow government agents
unfettered access to facial recognition technologies would constitute pre-
cisely this kind of threat, leaving at risk the “liberty of every man”245 and the
security of “society”246 against “too permeating police surveillance”247 be-
cause it would facilitate the kind of broad and indiscriminate surveillance
that was the bête noir of the Fourth Amendment in 1792 and the Carpenter
Court in 2018. True, broad, networked visual surveillance systems enabled
with facial recognition technology are not a present reality. But, as the Car-
penter Court noted, courts must “take account of more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or in development” when applying the Fourth Amend-
242. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
243. Gray, supra note 139, at 35 (explaining this concept using Immanuel Kant’s
categorical imperative).
244. Milligan, supra note 208, at 738–50; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Origi-
nal Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 552 (1999).
245. Otis, supra note 215, at 29.
246. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B.).
247. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
2021] Facial Recognition Technologies 39
ment248—and we have already seen applications of facial recognition tech-
nology that make clear that what was once science fiction is a looming
reality.249 Moreover, if the goal of imposing Fourth Amendment restraints on
new and emerging technologies is to protect the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, then it makes sense to set limits
early in the evolutionary cycle of a technology to make sure those guarantees
are never compromised and to guard against the dangers of technological
determinism, which marks a degradation of privacy as a result of the deploy-
ment and use of surveillance technologies, making it hard to scale-back tech-
nologies once they are in widespread use.250 In short, it behooves us to act
now rather than waiting until it is practically too late. That is true no matter
how limited the proposed use of facial recognition technology. The point is
that the decision whether, how, and in what circumstances facial recognition
technology can be used cannot be left to the unfettered discretion of execu-
tive agents any more than the choice whether, how, and in what circum-
stances to physically search a home.251
But what action should we take? The Supreme Court’s primary tool for
regulating search activities, including the deployment and use of surveillance
technologies, has been to require that officers obtain a warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate based on probable cause.252 The constitu-
tional pedigree of this “warrant requirement” is suspect.253 Some scholars
have argued that the warrant requirement is baked into the common law
248. Id. at 2218 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
249. See supra notes 1–51 and accompanying text.
250. Cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that “obtaining by sense enhancing technol-
ogy any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question
is not in general public use.”) (citation omitted).
251. Gray, supra note 139, at 31–34; see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often-competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
252. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“Having found that the acquisition of
Carpenter’s CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the Government must
generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such
records.”); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a de-
vice that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
253. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581–84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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fabric of the Fourth Amendment.254 Others contend that the Fourth Amend-
ment is genetically skeptical of warrants because they provide immunity
against civil actions.255 As a practical matter, the warrant requirement is so
riddled with exceptions that it operates more as a safe harbor, providing a
presumption of reasonableness when officers secure a warrant in advance of
a search while creating a presumption of unreasonableness when they do not.
Taking into account the best textual, historical, and doctrinal evidence,
the most sensible way to understand the warrant requirement is as a judicial
remedy created by the Court under authority granted to it by the reasonable-
ness clause.256 It is certainly a sensible prescription both in the abstract and in
light of the text. After all, the goal of the Fourth Amendment is to guarantee
our collective security against arbitrary exercises of executive power.257 The
warrant clause targets one potential source of insecurity—general warrants—
but also describes a process for limiting the discretionary powers of execu-
tive agents by requiring them to provide good and sufficient reasons to a
neutral judicial officer for limited grants of power to conduct searches of
254. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 207, at 1276–80.
255. Amar, supra note 206, 770–81 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment sought to
regulate warranted searches because warrants provided immunity against the
traditional common law protections afforded by juries in trespass actions); see
also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 212 (2015) (arguing that reading “an implicit war-
rant requirement for all searches and seizures runs counter to text, Founding-
era history, and common sense. Textually, as we have seen, the amendment
contains no third clause explicitly stating that ‘warrantless searches and
seizures are inherently unreasonable,’ or explicitly barring all ‘warrantless
searches and seizures.’”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston,
and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 53, 55 (1996) (“[T]he
[Fourth] Amendment does not require a warrant for each and every search or
seizure. It simply requires that each and every search or seizure be
reasonable.”).
256. GRAY, supra note 196, at 202–17; Gray, Fourth Amendment Rights as Reme-
dies: The Warrant Requirement, supra note 209, at 464–81; see also Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 581–84 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although the Fourth Amend-
ment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it is of course
textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of reasona-
bleness.”); cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“Although the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’ our cases
establish that warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where ‘a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.’ Thus, ‘[i]n the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only
if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
257. Gray, Fourth Amendment Rights as Remedies: The Warrant Requirement,
supra note 209, at 476–79.
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particular places for specific things.258 Although perhaps cumbersome for po-
lice officers, the Supreme Court has held that requiring them to run this pro-
cedural gauntlet strikes a reasonable balance between the competing interests
of citizens and law enforcement that are at stake in many cases where of-
ficers want to search persons, houses, papers, or effects.259
But does a warrant requirement always strike the right balance? Is it
always what reasonableness demands? According to the Court, the answer is
a resounding “no.” In a wide variety of circumstances, the Court has held that
requiring that government agents obtain a warrant before engaging in a
search or seizure would unreasonably compromise the governmental interests
at stake. So, government agents do not need warrants to make arrests in pub-
lic,260 to conduct stops or frisks,261 to carry out searches incident to arrest,262
to search cars,263 to search in the face of exigent circumstances,264 or to con-
duct searches in service of regulatory regimes.265 In all of these circum-
stances, the Court has sanctioned alternative means for limiting the
discretionary powers of government agents.266 In the criminal law context,
these alternatives usually require officers to justify their actions to a judicial
officer after the fact.267 In the regulatory context, legislatures and executive
agencies have considerable latitude to design mechanisms that serve as con-
stitutionally adequate substitutes for the warrant requirement.268 As the fore-
going discussion has shown, “constitutional adequacy” should be understood
258. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948); see also GRAY, supra
note 196, at 212.
259. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (“Crime, even in the privacy of one’s own quarters, is,
of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be
reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to
be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent. . . . No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the
inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers
and present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very convincing rea-
sons . . .”).
260. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975).
261. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
262. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
263. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–93 (1985).
264. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
265. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700–02 (1987).
266. Id. at 703.
267. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
268. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03.
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as procedural restraints on the discretion of executive agents sufficient to
guarantee the right of the people to be secure against arbitrary uses of state
power and broad, indiscriminate surveillance.269
Work done in the special needs context on alternatives to the warrant
requirement has much to teach us as we confront the Fourth Amendment
imperative to set constitutional limits on the deployment and use of facial
recognition technology.270 That is because the government interests at stake
in these kinds of surveillance technologies are somewhat different than those
at stake in the usual law enforcement context.271 In the mine run of criminal
cases, searches and seizures serve discrete investigative interests. Officers
suspect a particular individual of wrongdoing and want to search his home
for evidence of those specific crimes. Requiring officers to secure a warrant
in these circumstance does not unreasonably compromise the governmental
interests at stake. Instead, it simply means that officers must gather sufficient
evidence by other means to demonstrate to a reasonable degree of certainty
that evidence will be found in the place to be searched at the time of the
269. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“Having concluded, however, that the Government searched Car-
penter when it obtained cell-site records from his cell phone service providers,
the proper resolution of this case should have been to remand for the Court of
Appeals to determine in the first instance whether the search was reasonable.
Most courts of appeals, believing themselves bound by Miller and Smith, have
not grappled with this question. And the Court’s reflexive imposition of the
warrant requirement obscures important and difficult issues, such as the scope
of Congress’ power to authorize the Government to collect new forms of infor-
mation using processes that deviate from traditional warrant procedures, and
how the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement should apply when
the Government uses compulsory process instead of engaging in an actual,
physical search.”); id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“All of this is unneces-
sary. In the Stored Communications Act, Congress addressed the specific prob-
lem at issue in this case. The Act restricts the misuse of cell-site records by cell
service providers, something that the Fourth Amendment cannot do. The Act
also goes beyond current Fourth Amendment case law in restricting access by
law enforcement. It permits law enforcement officers to acquire cell-site
records only if they meet a heightened standard and obtain a court order. If the
American people now think that the Act is inadequate or needs updating, they
can turn to their elected representatives to adopt more protective provisions.
Because the collection and storage of cell-site records affects nearly every
American, it is unlikely that the question whether the current law requires
strengthening will escape Congress’s notice.”).
270. See Natalie Ram & David Gray, Mass Surveillance in the Age of COVID-19, 7
J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 1, 9–10 (2020) (suggesting a special needs framework for
regulating public health tracking technologies).
271. GRAY, supra note 196, at 266–67; Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 116 (ex-
plaining the distinction between technologies used in discrete investigative cir-
cumstances and technologies that must be deployed in advance).
2021] Facial Recognition Technologies 43
search and then submit that evidence to a neutral decisionmaker.272 On the
other side of the scales, the privacy and security interests at stake belong
most immediately to a specific person. A warrant process is well-designed to
vindicate those personal interests. Perhaps more importantly, that law en-
forcement officers are subject to the warrant requirement allows “the people”
to live a relative state of security against threats of arbitrary search and
seizure.273
In contrast with individual searches, the warrant process seems ill-suited
to the interests at stake in the deployment and use of surveillance technolo-
gies capable of facilitating “too permeating police surveillance.”274 That is
because these technologies need to be up and running in advance of when
they might be needed for a particular law enforcement purpose. For example,
imagine that law enforcement officers have an image of a murder suspect and
want to use facial recognition to identify her.275 That investigative strategy
could only bear fruit if a facial recognition system was already in place with
access to a robust database of identity-matched faces. Similarly, imagine that
investigators have the image of a terrorist suspect, know he is operating
somewhere in a metropolitan area, and want to use facial recognition tech-
nology to determine where he is and where he has been in recent days. They
could only vindicate these completely legitimate law enforcement interests if
a system of networked surveillance cameras with facial recognition capabili-
ties and substantial image storage capacities was already in place and operat-
ing in the background to gather, aggregate, and store comparator images.
In either of these scenarios, the legitimate government interests served
by facial recognition could not be served if officers had to get a warrant
before creating and deploying the technology. The only way for facial recog-
nition technologies to serve these legitimate government interests is to de-
velop and deploy them before they are needed in a particular case. This is an
endeavor that simply could not meet the particularity and probable cause
requirements of a warrant process. And then there are more quotidian appli-
cations, such as biometric access to secured areas, and non-criminal uses,
such as identity verification at immigration entry points. Though perhaps rea-
sonable, these kinds of programs are just not amenable to a warrant
requirement.
272. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
273. Id.
274. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1948)).
275. Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“[t]he police are looking for an individual or a
small number of individuals. They upload images of those individuals to a ‘hot
list.’ A face recognition program extracts faces from live video feeds of one or
more security cameras and continuously compares them, in real-time, to the
faces of the people on the hot list. Every person that walks by those security
cameras is subjected to this process. When it finds a match, the system may
send an alert to a nearby police officer.”).
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So, if it is unreasonable from a Fourth Amendment point of view to
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before deploying and using fa-
cial recognition technologies, then what is the alternative? This is where we
can take some guidance from the special needs context. Specifically, we
should think more expansively about systems and processes with the goal of
serving legitimate law enforcement interests while preserving the security of
the people against unreasonable searches. There are also many applications
of facial recognition technology that would fall squarely within the compass
of special needs, such as Hawaii’s proposal to use facial recognition as part
of its efforts to combat the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic,276 the use of facial rec-
ognition at immigration checkpoints,277 and the use of facial recognition as a
component of airport security.278 But even in the context of normal criminal
law enforcement, the special needs model has much to teach us about how to
set reasonable limits on the deployment and use of facial recognition
technologies.
Elsewhere, I have identified a framework that we can use to guide this
analysis.279 In that work, I argue that technologists and policymakers should
think about the lifecycle of searches conducted using contemporary surveil-
lance technologies and think about ways to interpose restraints on the devel-
opment, deployment, and use of those technologies with the goal of striking a
reasonable balance between the various government, privacy, and liberty in-
terests at stake. Applying that approach to facial recognition technologies
suggests focusing on five stages:
(1) Pre-Deployment Design and Review;
(2) Gathering and Aggregating Images and Data;
(3) Storage of Images and Data;
(4) Access to and Analysis of Images and Data;
(5) Use of the Results of that Analysis
The coming pages explore what is at stake at each of these opportunities and
identify some measures we might consider when designing, deploying, and
using facial recognition technologies.280
276. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 33–37 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 35–37 and accompanying text.
279. GRAY, supra note 196, at 267–74; Ram & Gray, supra note 270, at 10–16.
280. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya, and Jonathan Frankle have proposed very
thoughtful model legislation governing facial recognition. See Garvie et al.,
supra note 17 (model legislation can be found at https://
www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/files/2016-10/
Model%20Face%20Recognition%20Legislation.pdf). They have also drafted
parallel administrative rules. Id. (model policy can be found at https://
www.perpetuallineup.org/appendix/model-police-use-policy).
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A. Pre-Deployment Design and Review
Before deploying a facial recognition technology, proponents must iden-
tify the goals of the program and explain why it is likely to achieve these
goals. Likewise, proponents must identify potential consequences for Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional interests, including privacy, the poten-
tial for mass surveillance, grants of discretionary power, and equality.281 Par-
simony is a critical criterion at this stage.282 Program designers should clearly
and objectively weigh the likely benefits of a program against its potential
impact with an eye toward minimizing harm. This requirement is directly in
line with the Court’s elaboration of “reasonableness” in the Fourth Amend-
ment context, which requires striking a balance among the competing inter-
ests at stake in both general rules283 and specific instances of search and
seizure.284 This basic requirement for reason-giving and balancing of inter-
ests also mirrors the warrant clause’s oath and probable cause requirements,
which imagines government agents’ offering justifications for searches and
seizures, including likelihood of success, timing, manner, and extent to a
neutral arbiter.285 If pre-deployment review of a facial recognition program
shows that it is ineffective, not well-matched to its goals, unreasonably com-
promises citizens’ privacy and security interests, is excessively broad or in-
trusive, or produces too many negative externalities, then it would be
unreasonable to go forward. Proponents would then need to go back to the
drawing board.
Pre-deployment review should also include an analysis of how the de-
ployment and use of a technology would exacerbate background conditions
of social injustice.286 These are particularly salient questions when it comes
to facial recognition technologies.287 As Travis LeBlanc, former Chief of En-
forcement at the Federal Communications Commission and current member
of the Privacy and Civil Liberty Oversight Board, has pointed out, facial
recognition technologies are notoriously error-prone when asked to identify
281. See LeBlanc, supra note 21.
282. GRAY, supra note 196, at 267–68.
283. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–25 (1968) (weighing the competing
interests of law enforcement and citizens at stake to hold that stops and frisks
based on reasonable suspicion are constitutional).
284. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934–36 (1995) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment “knock and announce” requirement may give way in cir-
cumstances where knocking and announcing would compromise law enforce-
ment safety or the security of evidence).
285. GRAY, supra note 196, at 171.
286. LeBlanc, supra note 21 (arguing that surveillance technologies should be de-
signed with equality in mind and programs utilizing those technologies should
be subject to an equality impact assessment).
287. Id.
46 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXIV
non-White faces, leading to wrongful arrests and detentions that dispropor-
tionately affect persons of color.288 In a trenchant analysis, Mr. LeBlanc ar-
gues that technologists should take social justice goals into account when
creating facial recognition tools—a process he calls “equality by design”—
and that facial recognition technologies should be subject to “Equality Im-
pact Assessments,”289 a process akin to the environmental impact assess-
ments often required by the Environmental Protection Agency. It would be
unreasonable, he concludes, to deploy and use a facial recognition tool that
exhibits racial bias in its pattern of false positives.290
Pre-deployment review of facial recognition programs should be trans-
parent and public or, at the very least, publicly accountable.291 Ideally, pre-
deployment review would be open, affording all interested parties the oppor-
tunity to be heard. The end goal would be to generate some degree of consen-
sus among stakeholders either through the normal operations of civil society
and the political process292 or through consent decrees entered into to resolve
or avoid litigation.293
Designers should also incorporate regular, rigorous, transparent audits
and reviews in their plans for a program. No matter how careful and robust
288. Id.; see also GROTHER ET AL., supra note 21, at 2–3 (documenting racial dis-
parities in error rates produced by facial recognition technologies); Larry Har-
desty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial Artificial-
Intelligence Systems, MIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/
study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212 (same).
289. LeBlanc, supra note 21.
290. Id. Although the Court has opined that racial disparities in enforcement prac-
tices are not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
291. GRAY, supra note 196, at 268; Garvie et al., supra note 17 (“All face recogni-
tion use should be subject to public reporting and internal audits.”).
292. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261 (2018) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) (“Legislation is much preferable to the development of an entirely new
body of Fourth Amendment caselaw for many reasons, including the enormous
complexity of the subject, the need to respond to rapidly changing technology,
and the Fourth Amendment’s limited scope. The Fourth Amendment restricts
the conduct of the Federal Government and the States; it does not apply to
private actors. But today, some of the greatest threats to individual privacy may
come from powerful private companies that collect and sometimes misuse vast
quantities of data about the lives of ordinary Americans. If today’s decision
encourages the public to think that this Court can protect them from this loom-
ing threat to their privacy, the decision will mislead as well as disrupt. And if
holding a provision of the Stored Communications Act to be unconstitutional
dissuades Congress from further legislation in this field, the goal of protecting
privacy will be greatly disserved.”).
293. Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 116–23 (explaining the role of negotiated
agreements and consent decrees in regulating surveillance technologies).
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pre-deployment planning processes might be, it is impossible to understand
fully both the potentials and dangers of these programs before they are
deployed. In order to maintain the balance of interests that the Fourth
Amendment demands, government agencies, their private contractors, legis-
lators, courts, and civil society must learn from that experience with an eye
toward evaluating efficacy, measuring encroachment upon Fourth Amend-
ment interests, and guarding against mission creep. It would certainly be un-
reasonable to persist with a program that is not effective.294 Reviews may
also reveal that some programs are more intrusive than anticipated while
others prove to be more innocuous than first anticipated, requiring or al-
lowing adjustments to the program. But, above all else, programs must be
protected from efforts to leverage them for other purposes. Mission creep is
always a danger with surveillance technologies295—a reflection of the genetic
propensities of executive agencies to expand their claims to power.296 Regu-
lar, rigorous review, audits, and accountability to neutral third parties provide
the best means for guarding against mission creep.
294. Although the probable cause requirement of the warrant clause makes clear the
constitutional relevance of pre-search assessments of the likelihood of success,
courts have been reluctant to measure the grounds of those assessments against
past performance. Shima Baradaran Baughman has highlighted this oddity in
the Court’s jurisprudence. See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth
Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1 (2013). As Professor Baradaran Baughman
shows, that reluctance is particularly evident in the stop and frisk context,
where courts routinely accept platitudes like “furtive movements” as grounds
for reasonable suspicion despite shockingly low success rates. Id. The Supreme
Court, or at least Justice Kagan, seems to be coming around to Professor
Baradaran Baughman’s point, though. In Florida v. Harris, Justice Kagan,
writing for the Court, held that drug detection dogs’ past performances are
relevant when assessing whether their alerts are grounds for reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 245–50 (2013). Con-
curring in Kansas v. Glover, Justice Kagan made the same point with respect to
human police officers, noting that “defendants may question testifying officers
about such information. Indeed, an officer may have his own hit rate, which if
low enough could itself negate reasonable suspicion.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.
Ct. 1183 (2019).
295. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SUP-
PLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIEWS, 289–90 (Apr. 26, 1976).
296. Id. at 289 (“In time of crisis, the Government will exercise its power to conduct
domestic intelligence activities to the fullest extent. The distinction between
legal dissent and criminal conduct is easily forgotten.”); see also Gray, supra
note 139, at 169 (quoting MASERES, supra note 216, at 243–44 (noting that
governments and their agents are “fond of doctrines of reason of state, and state
necessity, and the impossibility of providing for great emergencies and ex-
traordinary cases, without a discretionary power in the crown to proceed some-
times by uncommon methods not agreeable to the known forms of law.”));
Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 92, 96–97.
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So, what might this requirement for rigorous pre-deployment review
look like in practice? Consider, as an example, a technology akin to
Clearview AI that purports to allow government agents to establish the iden-
tity of a person in an image. It sounds cool, but policymakers would need to
ask serious questions about efficacy. Is the technology actually capable of
doing what it promises? Does it provide material benefits over carbon-based
facial recognition systems? What is the error rate, both in terms of false posi-
tives and false negatives? Is the error rate higher when the technology is
applied to some races, genders, or ages? How will the program protect
against adverse consequences from mistakes? It would be unreasonable to
license the deployment of a technology that would seldom be helpful or
would produce unreliable results.297 In fact, several high-profile technology
companies and municipalities have suspended or terminated facial recogni-
tion programs when confronted with evidence of racial disparities in false
positives.298
B. Gathering and Aggregating Images and Data
Facial recognition requires at least two images: one that is identified and
a second that is compared to the first.299 Functionally, this means that a facial
recognition program needs a database of identified facial images that it can
use to make comparisons and sources of comparator images that require
identification. Each of these steps gives rise to practical, technical, privacy,
and liberty concerns.
297. This basic rule of reason is pervasive in the law. For example, reliability is a
central question when it comes to evaluating witness testimony or the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 607, 701, 702.
298. See, e.g., Ally Jarmanning, Boston Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technol-
ogy. It’s the 2nd-Largest City to Do So, WBUR, https://www.wbur.org/news/
2020/06/23/boston-facial-recognition-ban (June 24, 2020); Dina Bass,
Microsoft Won’t Sell Face Recognition Software to Police, BLOOMBERG L.
(June 12, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/
microsoft-wont-sell-police-face-recognition-software-for-now; Weise &
Singer, supra note 30; Shirin Ghaffary, San Francisco’s Facial Recognition
Technology Ban, Explained, VOX (May 14, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
recode/2019/5/14/18623897/san-francisco-facial-recognition-ban-explained;
Hannah Denham, IBM’s Decision to Abandon Facial Recognition Technology
Fueled by Years of Debate, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/11/ibm-facial-recognition/.
299. Clearview AI appears to use a slightly different model, compiling massive
databases of images, comparing images in that database, and drawing connec-
tions between probable matches, but does not necessarily establish the identity
of a particular face. See How Clearview AI Works, CLEARVIEW.AI, https://
clearview.ai/ (last visited June 14, 2021). It instead preserves source data on
images in its database so a user can, for example, go to the webpage whence
the image came. See id.
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To build its database, a facial recognition program would need to either
gather and aggregate images directly or access existing image caches. Both
approaches entail practical challenges. Where will the program get the
images? How will it attach identities to those images? How will it verify the
accuracy of those identifications? There are technical considerations as well,
which affect both database images and comparator images. Facial recogni-
tion technologies require images that are of sufficiently high quality and must
either be in a digital format or converted to a digital format. Clarity, lighting,
and angle also affect the ability of facial recognition tools to make reliable
matches. Databases comprised of low-quality images taken from a variety of
angles and taken under different conditions are less likely to produce consis-
tent, reliable results.
There are also questions of robustness. Does the technology have access
to a sufficiently large database of confirmed identities? This is a particularly
important question for identification programs—as opposed to verification
programs. Identification programs cannot succeed unless they contain an im-
age of the person presented for comparison. Robustness must, of course, be
balanced against privacy interests. A universal image database would cer-
tainly be sufficiently robust but would also raise the specter of broad and
indiscriminate surveillance while threatening the privacy of, well, everyone!
On the other hand, an image database comprised of booking photographs
taken of arrestees would pose fewer privacy and liberty concerns,300 but
might well be sufficiently robust to serve most law enforcement interests in
identifying suspects of crime—the usual suspects, and all.
Notice, consent, and scale also play important roles here. The Court has
long held that if a person is on notice that they are subject to surveillance,
then their expectations of privacy may be diminished or exhausted.301 Simi-
larly, those who voluntarily share information do not have a Fourth Amend-
ment complaint if government agents access that information through lawful
means.302 Neither can they complain if they consent to a search.303 While the
300. Cf. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 438 (2013) (finding that arrestees and
indictees have reduced expectations of privacy that licenses warrantless search
procedures related to normal custodial procedures); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 322–23 (2012) (holding that prisoners have dimin-
ished expectations of privacy, allowing jails to conduct strip searches).
301. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (observing constitu-
tionally protected areas from public airspace is not a “search” for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
250–51 (1986) (same); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (same);
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (using a radio beeper
tracking device to monitor movements in public is not a “search” for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment).
302. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (holding law en-
forcement’s accessing telephonic records does not violate a user’s reasonable
expectations of privacy); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 23 (1974)
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Court has declined to extend these doctrines in the case of means and meth-
ods of surveillance that are capable of facilitating broad and indiscriminate
surveillance,304 it generally does not impose Fourth Amendment constraints
on more limited means.305
Together, these considerations counsel in favor of programs that are
limited in scope and seek consent from, or at least provide notice to, those
whose images are gathered and aggregated, or at least provide notice that
their images are being gathered. Programs that derogate from this ideal raise
more serious Fourth Amendment concerns and therefore require compelling
justification and stricter constraints when it comes to analysis and access.
Additionally, programs that use means that are themselves subject to Fourth
Amendment restraint would need to incorporate additional constitutional pro-
tections. To see how all of this might work, let us consider a few examples.
(holding law enforcement’s accessing banking records through a bank does not
violate customers’ reasonable expectations of privacy); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation when an
undercover agent reports what suspect said in his presence).
303. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (“In a society based on law,
the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of
its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens
for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of
his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding.
When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.”).
304. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (“We decline to
grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier’s database of physical
location information. In light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of
its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does
not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”). See also
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In the
precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional
nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance
at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four
weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and
perhaps aerial assistance. Only an investigation of unusual importance could
have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like
the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring rela-
tively easy and cheap.”).
305. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84 (declining to subject radio beeper tracking devices
to Fourth Amendment regulation in part because they cannot facilitate “drag-
net-type” law enforcement practices). See also Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at
131–33 (explaining how a “technology-centered approach” to the Fourth
Amendment distinguishes between technologies capable of facilitating pro-
grams of broad and indiscriminate search, which should be subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation, and those that are not, which should not).
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One application for facial recognition technologies might be to limit
access to facilities such as workplaces and residential buildings. This would
require an image database comprised of authorized employees or residents,
which could be collected directly and with the notice and consent of those
whose images are in the database. As a result, the privacy concerns raised by
this kind of program would be relatively slight and the risks of broad and
indiscriminate surveillance small—so long as the program stays in its lane. It
would be both unnecessary and ineffective for this kind of program to aggre-
gate or draw from a larger, more general database of images. It would like-
wise be unreasonable for images gathered by this kind of limited verification
program to share its data with other programs—at least on a routine basis
(one can certainly imagine circumstances where law enforcement officers
might want access to a system like this to help solve a specific crime). As we
shall see in a moment, limits on access akin to a warrant requirement would
probably strike the right constitutional balance.
This is not to suggest that these limited use programs do not entail any
privacy, liberty, or surveillance concerns. At the very least, they construct a
record of people’s comings and goings. In a world where these kinds of sys-
tems are broadly deployed, there is the potential to engage in the kind of
location tracking that raised Fourth Amendment concerns for the Carpenter
Court.306 So, organizations considering facial recognition as a verification
tool would need to consider carefully whether facial recognition is necessary
in light of the security and access concerns at stake. It might well be reasona-
ble to use facial recognition at a secure research facility but unreasonable to
use it at an elementary school or public library.
By contrast, some facial recognition applications would need very large
image databases and would probably need to access databases and image
caches created for other purposes. Here we might imagine a system, such as
Clearview AI, with aspirations of being able to identify anyone, and therefore
everyone. A system with these kinds of ambitions would need wide access to
a variety of image sources ranging from drivers’ licenses to social media.
Almost by definition, those whose images would be gathered and aggregated
for this kind of program would be neither notified nor given the opportunity
to consent.307 These programs therefore raise serious privacy concerns. They
also represent an immediate threat of broad and indiscriminate surveillance.
What could be more threatening of a surveillance dystopia than an all-inclu-
sive database of everyone’s face! Whether these programs could meet Fourth
Amendment demands would therefore turn on the benefits they realistically
promise for law enforcement and the ability to guarantee security against
unreasonable searches by setting strict limits on analysis and access, which,
as we shall see, is the approach the Court took in Carpenter.
306. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
307. This is the basis of the class action lawsuit against Clearview AI in Illinois. See
supra note 28.
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Between these two extremes there is a wide range of potential applica-
tions that would vary in terms of scale, the sizes of their databases, sources of
images, and levels of notice and consent. For example, cross-referencing sys-
tems, such as those used to verify the identity of visa and passport holders
entering the country, would need a database that included all visa and pass-
port holders, but those images would be gathered directly, on notice, and
with at least implied consent. These databases would also be fairly modest in
scale, only gathering comparator images from persons presenting themselves
at immigration entry points.
We can also imagine more targeted identification systems focusing on
terrorists or dangerous criminals. These kinds of programs would only re-
quire relatively small databases of images associated with known terrorists or
designated criminal suspects. Such images might come from a variety of
sources ranging from surveillance footage taken at the scene of a crime to
mugshots to driver’s license photos,308 some of which would be gathered on
notice and consent, and others not. But, given the limited scope and targeted
need, these kinds of programs would raise many fewer privacy and surveil-
lance concerns than programs like Clearview AI—at least with respect to the
aggregation of databases. Gathering comparator images might present thorn-
ier concerns if, for example, law enforcement agents wanted to screen con-
stantly images of everyone traversing public spaces in a search for criminal
suspects. So, these programs would need to run the same Fourth Amendment
gauntlets as any other program by clearly articulating the reasonable benefits
they hope to achieve while balancing the privacy interests at stake, threats to
liberty, and risks of broad and indiscriminate surveillance.
Separate from the process of gathering and aggregating images for a
database, facial recognition technologies must also gather comparator
images. Here, again, the Fourth Amendment issues at stake depend on the
purpose and scale of the program. Returning to our examples, an access con-
trol system would only need to, and should only, acquire images of persons
seeking access to the secured facility. It would be unnecessary and unreason-
able for the system to gather images of passersby or from cameras at a re-
mote location. But, assuming proper restraint, all those whose images would
be taken for comparison purposes by this kind of limited facial recognition
program would have consented to having their image taken by virtue of their
presenting themselves for verification, again limiting the scope of Fourth
Amendment concerns for these limited systems.
By contrast, more ambitious programs raise serious concerns when
gathering and aggregating comparator images. This is entirely due to their
scale and aspirations. At their apotheosis, these programs aim at what Chris-
topher Slobogin has described as “panvasive” surveillance.309 They aspire to
308. See Garvie et al., supra note 17 (finding that more than half of states allow
facial recognition programs to access driver’s license databases).
309. See Slobogin, supra note 43, at 1723.
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identify everyone, everywhere, at any time. Granting these kinds of programs
unlimited authority to gather and aggregate comparator images on an ongo-
ing basis from hundreds or thousands of cameras would violate the reasona-
ble expectations of privacy we all have in the totality of our public
movements.310 It would also trigger concerns about broad, indiscriminate sur-
veillance and unfettered executive discretion that animated the Fourth
Amendment when it was ratified. Given these concerns, there are serious
questions about the Fourth Amendment viability of these kinds of facial rec-
ognition programs. The Fourth Amendment may just prohibit the deployment
and use of technologies capable of identifying and tracking everyone, every-
where, all the time.311 At the very least, the scale of these programs, as de-
scribed by their ravenous need for both database and comparator images,
signals the need for very strict access and use controls.312
Fourth Amendment concerns raised by other facial recognition pro-
grams will scale according to when comparator images are gathered, how,
and how many. It might be reasonable for immigration control programs to
gather comparator images at border kiosks and reentry desks in order to con-
firm the identities of travelers seeking entry into the country. These folks are
on notice that their images are being taken, and the application would be
sufficiently limited to avoid fears of broad and indiscriminate surveillance.
Less reasonable would be requests to gather comparator images from shop-
ping malls and street cameras to identify persons who might be in the country
illegally. This would ensnare tens of thousands of persons who are not on
notice that their images are being taken for facial comparison. It also smacks
of the kind of “too permeating police surveillance” that has animated the
Fourth Amendment since 1792.313 Likewise, programs targeted at identifying
known terrorist and criminal suspects that seek broad access to surveillance
cameras and networks in order to monitor public places would trigger serious
privacy concerns while also raising the specter of a surveillance state.314 As
with panvasive surveillance programs, these uses of facial recognition tech-
nology may just be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but, at the
very least, would require strict access and use controls sufficient to guarantee
the right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches.315
310. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the whole of their physical movements”).
311. See, e.g., Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 979 F.3d 219, 248 (4th Cir.
2020) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (concluding that plaintiffs were entitled to a
preliminary injunction halting an aerial surveillance program).
312. Id. at 230–32 (holding that an aerial surveillance program was constitutional in
part because it featured extensive internal regulations and access controls).
313. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
314. See id.
315. See Slobogin, supra note 43, at 1761.
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C. Storage of Images and Data
Aggregated images do not simply flow through facial recognition tech-
nologies. They must be stored. The primary questions program designers
must address when it comes to storage are what, how much, and how long.
Our present capacity to store information is basically unlimited. Government
agencies have access to facilities capable of storing yottabytes of data.316
There are, therefore, no practical limits on the capacity of facial recognition
programs to aggregate and store billions of images.317 This kind of storage
capacity would provide facial recognition programs with long memories, al-
lowing government agents to return to both databases and comparator images
again and again into perpetuity.
There is no doubt that this storage capacity and the ability to conduct
future queries about the past raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns. The
Carpenter Court highlighted some of these pointing out that “the retrospec-
tive quality of [cell site location] data” allows government agents to “travel
back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts.”318 This potential would be at
its apogee in the case of programs that aspire to panvasive surveillance ca-
pacities because “this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone,”319
but even more modest programs would raise concerns. For example, an ac-
cess control program that uses facial recognition technology could monitor a
subject’s comings and goings in secured premises going back years, provid-
ing a record of location data that might be very revealing of the intimate
details of their lives—think, here, about a system that monitored the move-
ments of college students in dormitories. And then there is the very real risk
that stored images and data might be mined for purposes other than those
justifying their initial gathering and aggregation. Large caches of stored data
seem to invite mission creep.
The primary tools for mitigating the Fourth Amendment harms of facial
recognition technologies at the storage phase is to set clear limits on what is
stored and for how long.320 Systems inevitably will gather and aggregate sur-
plus images. That information should not be stored. Regular audits are likely
to be required to make sure that programs do not stock-up on images they do
316. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY 177–96 (2008) (documenting
government efforts to build data storage facilities capable of storing yottabytes
of data); James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy
Center, WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:34 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff-
nsadatacenter/.
317. Bamford, supra note 316.
318. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 2220.
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not need or should not have.321 Programs must also have strict rules on data
destruction. If an employee leaves a company that uses facial recognition to
control access to corporate facilities, then their image should be deleted from
the database. In a similar vein, comparator images should be deleted immedi-
ately after the time horizon for the program’s goals have passed. Once a
person’s identity has been confirmed at the front door of a building or an
immigration checkpoint, there is no reason to store it.
Of course, the most challenging programs from a Fourth Amendment
point of view will be those that aspire to panvasive capacities. By design,
these programs will seek to store as many database images as they can while
gathering, aggregating, and storing as many comparator images from as
many sources as is possible for as long as is possible.322 These aspirations to
omnipotence are squarely opposed to Fourth Amendment guarantees against
broad, indiscriminate surveillance and grants of unfettered discretion to
search.323 To have any hope of achieving constitutionally required reasona-
bleness, these programs must curb their aspirations by culling images. This is
particularly true of comparator images. Regularly deleting comparator
images, such as feeds from surveillance cameras, would go a long way to-
ward meeting the Fourth Amendment concerns cited by the Court in
Carpenter.324
Another potentially important tool for regulating facial recognition tech-
nologies at the storage stage is siloing. This can be accomplished either by
constructing discrete silos into which aggregated images and information are
segregated or by simply leaving information in the custody and control of
those who gathered it in the first place. This is one of the strategies adopted
by Congress in its efforts to set limits on the National Security Agency’s
(NSA) telephony metadata program.325 Under the terms of the 2015 USA
Freedom Act, caller metadata is no longer turned over to the NSA in bulk.326
That data remains instead with the telephone companies. To gain access to
this data, the NSA must now formulate targeted search queries.327 Similar
measures designed to make sure that database images and comparator images
are properly segregated will go a long way toward guarding against mission
creep while also reinforcing rules on access.
321. Notably, facial recognition programs in place now are seldom subject to audit
or review. See Garvie et al., supra note 17 (finding that the vast majority of
facial recognition systems “are not audited for misuse”).
322. See Slobogin, supra note 43, at 1746.
323. See id. at 1722.
324. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
325. Cody M. Poplin, NSA Ends Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata under Sec-
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In addition to established limits on the storage of database and compara-
tor images, facial recognition programs should be subject to regular audits
and recursive review to determine whether more images and data are being
stored than is necessary to achieve the stated goals of the program. These
ongoing reviews are sure to reveal waste, surplusage, and opportunities to
tailor information storage practices in light of actual experience. That is as it
should be. Programs that keep and store more images and information than is
reasonably necessary to achieve their stated goals compromise Fourth
Amendment interests in privacy and security from surveillance while also
offering temptations for mission creep.328
D. Access to and Analysis of Images and Data
Databases of identified facial images are the lifeblood of facial recogni-
tion technologies. Once aggregated, these databases present a tempting target
for facial recognition programs, particularly those with broad or ill-defined
ambitions. Consider image databases aggregated by departments of motor
vehicles. These are frequent targets for facial recognition programs.329 Fourth
Amendment concerns with broad and indiscriminate surveillance as well as
grants of unfettered state power become more significant as programs gain
access to more and larger facial databases. At the same time, reliance on
notice and consent as grounds to justify the gathering, aggregation, and stor-
age of images in these databases dissipate as access broadens. If I consent to
have my picture taken and the image stored by my employer in order to gain
access to secured areas of my workplace, then that consent cannot justify
sharing that image with a national crime control database used to identify
suspects and witnesses.
In order to guarantee security against unreasonable searches, access to
image databases must be controlled in accordance with their original pur-
poses and the terms governing their gathering and aggregation practices.330
By limiting access along these lines, facial recognition programs can dramat-
ically reduce threats of unreasonable searches and panvasive surveillance.
Constitutional actors, inclusive of executive agencies, legislatures, and
courts, should be very cautious about expanding access to image databases
and should never do so without providing clear notice and real opportunities
for individuals to opt-out.
More may be necessary to provide similar protections for databases or
image resources held by private actors. For example, Clearview AI report-
edly scrapes social media websites to build its image databases.331 Although
there is a case to be made that Clearview AI is a state actor for purposes of
328. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
329. See supra note 34, and accompanying text.
330. Cf. Garvie et al., supra note 17 (calling for strict limits to image databases,
such as driver’s license photos).
331. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the fact that its primary contracts are
with law enforcement and other government agencies,332 courts are reluctant
to impose Fourth Amendment restraints on private corporations and per-
sons.333 Legislatures therefore ought to act by passing privacy protections
that give individuals control over the use of their images and identities. The
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation protects biometric in-
formation.334 So do some state privacy laws.335 Unfortunately, Congress has
332. Gray & Citron, supra note 45, at 133–37 (arguing that corporations that regu-
larly provide consumer information to law enforcement are “state agents” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment); Ram & Gray, supra note 270, at 6 (ex-
plaining how the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217,
widens the scope of Fourth Amendment protections when government agents
seek location information from private companies).
333. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (“The
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one,
effected by a private party on his own initiative.”); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (distinguishing between private agents
who act at the direction of law enforcement and those who do not); Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that a burglar acting on his own
initiative is not a state agent for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
334. See General Data Protection Regulation, art. 9 (Eur.) (“Processing of personal
data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophi-
cal beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, bio-
metric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data
concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orien-
tation shall be prohibited.”).
335. Illinois was the first state to identify concerns involving the use of biometric
technology. In 2008, Illinois passed its Biometric Information Privacy Act
(BIPA), which places limitations on how private entities can collect, store, and
use biometric data. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5 (West 2008). Texas and
Washington have since enacted similar laws. Henry Kusjanovic, BIPA: An Ex-
ample That More States Should Follow, LOWEY DANNENBERG (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.lowey.com/blog/bipa-an-example-that-more-states-should-follow/.
The BIPA requires private corporations in possession of biometric information
or identifiers to establish a publicly accessible retention policy. See 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5 (West 2008). Additionally, the BIPA provides guide-
lines of what requires written approval and written notice and provides guide-
lines for how a private entity could profit from the use of someone’s biometric
information. See id. In January 2020, Facebook settled a class-action suit alleg-
ing violations of the BIPA. See Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay
$550 Million to Settle Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/facebook-privacy-lawsuit-
earnings.html. Later that year, the American Civil Liberties Union sued
Clearview for violation of the BIPA. ACLU Sues Clearview AI, supra note 28.
Few states have taken steps to address mounting concerns surrounding fa-
cial recognition. A few of the most notable states are Oregon, New Hampshire,
and California who each have laws banning facial recognition technology on
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yet to take any action to constrain access to images by facial recognition
programs.336 That is a failure to perform on its constitutional duty to guaran-
tee the security of the people against unreasonable searches.337
Separate from the question of access to image databases is the question
of access to facial recognition programs and their analytic results. The Fourth
Amendment is genetically concerned with grants of broad, unfettered discre-
tion to executive agents.338 The Court is very cautious about granting execu-
tive agents that kind of broad authority, which presages broad and
indiscriminate surveillance.339 The primary tool for limiting discretion to
police body cameras. See Benjamin Hodges & Kelly Mennemeier, The Varying
Laws Governing Facial Recognition Technology, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 28,
2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/28/varying-laws-governing-fa-
cial-recognition-technology/id=118240/. On March 31, 2020, Washington State
approved most of the SB 6280, which attempts to regulate the state and local
government agencies use of facial recognition services by July 2021. See Euge-
nia Lostri, Washington’s New Facial Recognition Law, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.csis.org/blogs/technology-policy-
blog/washingtons-new-facial-recognition-law.
336. There is not yet a federal law regulating facial recognition. In June 2020, legis-
lators introduced the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Morato-
rium Act of 2020, in the Senate—S. 4084, 116th Cong. (2020)—and the
House—H.R. 7356, 116th Cong. (2020)—which would ban federal agencies
from acquiring, possessing, accessing, or using any form of biometric surveil-
lance on U.S. soil. The legislation would also make federal funding for state
and local law enforcement dependent on the establishment of similar bans. In
August 2020, Senators Jeffrey Merkley and Bernie Sanders introduced the Na-
tional Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2020. S. 4400, 116th Cong.
(2020). Their bill would require that companies receive consent before collect-
ing biometric information and establish clear retention and destruction sched-
ules. See id.
337. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(lamenting the fact that “Congress and most States have not enacted statues
regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes”).
338. See supra notes 201–230 and accompanying text; Jones, 565 U.S. at 416
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by avail-
able at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information
about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses
to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way
that is inimical to democratic society.’”) (internal citation omitted).
339. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018) (“The ‘basic
purpose of this Amendment,’ our cases have recognized, ‘is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.’ . . . the Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against
‘arbitrary power.’”) (internal citations omitted); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would also consider the appropriateness of en-
trusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate
branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amend-
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conduct physical searches is the warrant requirement, which lodges with
“neutral and detached magistrate[s]” rather than “zealous officers . . . en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” the task of
determining whether a search is reasonable.340 But the Court has demon-
strated considerable flexibility, allowing for a range of remedial measures
designed to limit the authority and discretion of government agents to con-
duct searches and seizures.341 For example, police officers have authority in
the first instance to determine whether there is probable cause to justify an
arrest,342 but must justify those decision to detached and neutral magistrates
after the fact.343 The Court has also sanctioned a range of different regulatory
structures for searches conducted in service of regulatory and administrative
goals under the “special needs” doctrine.344 These precedents show that the
form of constitutional restraint on executive agents should be linked to the
nature and purpose of a search program and the means and methods
deployed.345
The ultimate goal of limiting access to databases and analysis is to pro-
tect individual privacy while also guarding against overbroad searches, un-
limited searches, and mission creep. The dangers of overbreadth are obvious.
Using facial recognition programs to conduct general surveillance or to
search for connections and patterns unrelated to or only tangentially related
to the legitimate governmental interests cited to justify a program is, by defi-
nition, unreasonable.346 So, too, is granting unlimited discretion for agents to
access and run searches. It would certainly be unreasonable, for example, if
officers could use a facial recognition program to conduct personal searches,
such as identifying a person whom they suspect of having an affair with a
spouse. Likewise, it would be unreasonable to use facial recognition technol-
ogy to target political, religious, or racial groups.347 Finally, there is the dan-
ger that a facial recognition program justified for one purpose may be used
for entirely different purposes that were not contemplated when the program
was designed, rendering its regulatory control structures incapable of secur-
ing constitutional rights. This kind of mission not only threatens to expand
ment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent ‘a too
permeating police surveillance.’”) (internal citations omitted).
340. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
341. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975).
342. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113–14.
343. Id.
344. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03.
345. See id.; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113–14.
346. See Garvie et al., supra note 17.
347. Id. (“Use of face recognition to track people on the basis of their political or
religious beliefs or their race or ethnicity should be banned.”).
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the scope of a facial recognition program, but also increases the dangers of
false negatives and false positives.
Taking these considerations into account leads to the conclusion that
access to some facial recognition programs should be governed by a warrant
requirement. The most likely candidates are programs that pose the most sig-
nificant dangers for broad and indiscriminate surveillance. On first blush, it
may seem that a warrant requirement would spell the death knell for these
kinds of facial recognition programs. To serve their purposes, these kinds of
programs must be up and running well before they are needed, gathering,
aggregating, and storing images and refining the algorithms used to conduct
comparisons on a grand scale. But that charge misunderstands the remedy.
The point would be to use warrants to limit access, not to bar deployment.
So, the program might be deployed and active, but officers who want to run a
search would need prior approval from a detached and neutral magistrate.
This is precisely the approach adopted by the Court in Carpenter.348 There,
the Court used a warrant requirement to limit government access to cell site
location data, which is continually gathered, aggregated, and stored by cellu-
lar service providers.349 In the Court’s view, that struck the right balance,
protecting privacy, guarding against “too permeating police surveillance,”
while also preserving reasonable access to an important law enforcement
tool. Congress took a similar approach in the USA Freedom Act, requiring
national security agencies to secure a court order before accessing telephonic
metadata gathered and stored by telephone service providers.350 Given the
privacy issues at stake, and potential for abuse, it may also be necessary to
limit access to investigations of particularly serious crimes,351 where tradi-
tional law enforcement techniques have been exhausted,352 or both.353
The Carpenter Court’s use of a warrant requirement may provide a use-
ful model for bringing many facial recognition programs in line with Fourth
Amendment commands; but a warrant requirement would unreasonably com-
promise government interests at stake in many programs.354 Consider facial
recognition programs deployed in support of government activities outside
the law enforcement context that fall within the compass of “special needs.”
These programs are likely to be narrowly tailored and, due to their nature and
348. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210–11 (2018).
349. Id.
350. USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2014).
351. Garvie et al., supra note 17 (arguing that law enforcement should only have
access to facial recognition technologies when investigating serious crimes).
352. This exhaustion requirement is a feature of the Wiretap Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(3)(b)–(c) (1998).
353. See id. (add “id.”) § 2518(7) (limiting access to wiretapping to an enumerated
list of crimes after investigators have exhausted other investigative means).
354. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
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purpose, unable to meet the demands of the warrant clause.355 For example,
immigration enforcement agents who want to use facial recognition technol-
ogy to verify the identity of a passport or visa holder at a border checkpoint
would not be able to demonstrate probable cause. On the other hand, this
kind of program would only ensnare individuals who have knowingly sub-
mitted a database image and knowingly presented themselves for compari-
son. This kind of narrowly contrived program also does not pose a significant
threat of broad and indiscriminate surveillance. So, a warrant requirement in
this case would not only be inapt, but excessive, and therefore unreasonable.
This does not mean that facial recognition technologies deployed in ser-
vice of administrative regimes and other special needs should not be subject
to constitutional restraints. Quite to the contrary, access to image databases
aggregated for these programs should be strictly limited in accordance with
the purposes of a program. This may mean limiting access to particular
places, such as terminals at border checkpoints, particular persons, such as
agents on shift at those checkpoints, or pursuant to supervisory authority ac-
cording to clearly defined rules, such as assessing the immigration status of
an individual arrested on criminal charges. These access limits should have
teeth. Those who misuse a technology should be subject to administrative,
civil, or criminal consequences.356
Regardless of the front-end limits on access to facial recognition
databases and analyses, reasonableness dictates the use of audit trails or other
means of documenting who gains access, their sources of authority, and the
nature of the searches they run.357 This kind of access control is necessary to
preserve accountability before and after the fact. Before the fact, these kinds
of controls will limit access. They will also encourage restraint because those
accessing a program will know that they are, well, under surveillance. Fi-
nally, reliable audit trails will make evaluating program effectiveness much
easier while also providing a means for identifying mistake, abuse, or
malfeasance.
E. Use of Results of that Analysis
In addition, other limits on the deployment and use of facial recognition
technologies, programs should set limits on how the results of comparisons
and analyses can be used. Here, again, the primary concerns are exploitation,
which may unreasonably compromise the security of individuals or targeted
groups, and mission creep, which may threaten other constitutional interests,
such as First Amendment rights, or Fourth Amendment guarantees against
broad and indiscriminate surveillance. In order to guarantee focus and tight
355. Id.
356. This Court has cited these kinds of consequences in upholding special needs
search regimes. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 444, 465 (2013).
357. Garvie et al., supra note 17 (calling for audits as a means to curb misuse of
facial recognition technology).
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connections between justification and use, programs must set limits on who
can use the results and how. For example, it would be entirely unreasonable
to allow the results of a facial recognition program designed to confirm the
identities of those entering the country to target members of particular relig-
ious groups or to use a technology designed to identify criminal suspects to
identify participants in lawful political protests. Absent these kinds of con-
trols, the threat of mission creep and the potential for abuse is simply too
strong, threatening the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches.
Independent audits and external accountability will play critical roles in
setting and enforcing these limits. Although a warrant requirement may not
always strike the right balance, the Court’s defense of the warrant require-
ment as a means for insulating critical decisions from the effects of bias,
interest, and mission-blindness illuminates the importance of third-party re-
view and accountability for all facial recognition programs. Outside review-
ers could measure and adjust internal rules and practices to guarantee that
technologies are being used in ways that faithfully reflect the balancing of
interests that informed pre-deployment design. They can also make regular
assessments of effectiveness to determine whether the goals of a program are
being met. External reviews will have important disciplinary effects on
agents as well. If individuals accessing the results of a facial recognition
analysis know that they will be subject to administrative, civil, or criminal
consequences, then they are bound to be more measured in the way they use
facial recognition and more cognizant of the constitutional and privacy inter-
ests at stake.
Finally, consistent, regular, and rigorous review will allow programs to
adjust along the way. Despite their best efforts, designers, legislators, civic
groups, and executive agents cannot anticipate all the legitimate uses to
which a facial recognition technology or its components might be put. Like-
wise, they cannot anticipate all the dangers of expansion, mission creep, and
misuse. It will therefore be necessary to revisit many of the same questions
that drive pre-deployment design in the context of consistent, rigorous
programmatic review. If a program turns out not to serve its purpose, or to
serve its purpose less well than less intrusive alternatives, then it should be
shut down. If an audit reveals that a program is gathering more images than it
needs or storing images longer than is reasonably necessary, then adjust-
ments should be made to aggregation and storage practices. As was the case
in the pre-deployment stage, these reviews should be open and transparent or,
at the very least, accountable to all interested groups through responsible
representatives.
IV. CONCLUSION
We find ourselves at a cusp when it comes to facial recognition technol-
ogies. Once science fiction, these technologies have evolved rapidly in recent
years, threatening to make the nightmares of George Orwell and Philip K.
Dick a reality. The Fourth Amendment guarantees our security against those
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threats, but it is, after all, just words on a page. It is the solemn duty of
constitutional actors in all three branches of our governments to breathe life
into those words by giving effect to our birthright. This article has identified
the challenges and has charted a path forward. It now falls to each of us and
all of us citizens to take and demand action.

